OSHA’s final recordkeeping rule confirms, among other things, post-accident drug testing does not constitute retaliation

OHSA issued a final rule regarding recordkeeping, which, among other things, confirms its position that, contrary to a 2016 Obama-era rule, post-accident drug testing does not constitute prohibited retaliation.

In response to concerns about the application of the 2016 final rule to employee drug testing and incident- based incentive programs, OSHA notes that the employee protection provisions promulgated by that final rule and codified at 29 CFR 1904.35 neither ban drug testing employees involved in workplace injury or illnesses, nor prohibit incident-based incentive programs. Rather, §1904.35(b)(1)(iv) merely prohibits employers from implementing these programs to penalize workers ‘‘for reporting a work- related injury or illness.’’ Id. (emphasis added). … To the extent the 2016 preamble suggested otherwise, it has been superseded. While not the focus of this particular rulemaking, that memorandum accurately reflects OSHA’s position and addresses the commenters’ concerns.

Source: “Tracking of Workplace Injuries and Illnesses,” 84 Fed. Reg. 380 (1/25/19)

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Third Circuit expounds on class actions in wage claims

A class action is a way for one or more persons to sue on behalf of a voluminous group of similarly situated persons. The idea is that the claim may not be financially worthwhile for one or a few people to prosecute, but where many people have suffered the same wrong, it makes sense for them to litigate the claims all at once, just as it is more efficient for the courts and defendant.

Wage claims are often for relatively small amounts, when one considers only one plaintiff, but can be for huge amounts when prosecuted on behalf of a claim. Wage claims though aren’t technically called a class action. Wage claims are prosecuted under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which provides for “collective” actions; whereas, class actions are prosecuted under Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

What’s the difference between a class action and a collective action? Well, there aren’t many, but the few differences there are, are indeed significant. The biggest difference is conceptual and practical. In a class action, the judge declares a “class,” and members can opt out if they don’t wish to be part of the lawsuit. In a collective action (a FLSA wage claim), the judge declares the potential class, but members have to opt in to become part of the lawsuit.

There are other significant differences in terms of the procedures and standards court follow at the start of the case. Those differences can drive significant outcomes in terms of settlement strategies and litigation approaches.

Still, the differences can be as subtle as they are sometimes significant, triggering relatively frequent litigation in the courts. The Tenth Circuit has, for example, said, in a 2001 decision (Thiessen) that there is “little difference in the various approaches”  under Rule 23 for class actions versus FLSA for collective actions. However the Third Circuit, in a recent decision, Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., held the differences, though often slight, are significant enough that an appeal involving the one did not give it jurisdiction to consider issues related to the other. The Third Circuit, therefore, declined to decide whether certification of a collective action under FLSA was appropriate, even though it did decide that certification of a class under Rule 23 was inappropriate. The court left the collective action certification for the lower court and later litigation.

In so ruling, the court did, though, hold that the class action Rule 23 certification — the issue on appeal before it — had been improper. The Court clarified that, in order to prove that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging “off the clock” work was appropriate for class certification, Rule 23 required them to prove that they, and the requested class members, could all show that their rights were violated using the same evidence of liability. It was not sufficient to prove that they had all been wronged by the same employer, that they had all been shorted wages to which they should have been entitled, or even that they had all been shorted in the same way. Rule 23, the Third Circuit held, requires that they prove they, and the requested class, could establish their cases using common evidence.

As for the merits of their claim, the Third Circuit opined that, to prove an off-the-clock work claim, the plaintiffs would need to show they had worked off the clock, which constituted overtime, and that the employer had at least “constructive knowledge” of the same. The court did not explain what would constitute “constructive knowledge.”

To satisfy their wage-and-hour claims, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) pursuant to Citizens’ unwritten “policy-to-violate-the-policy,” the class MLOs performed overtime work for which they were not properly compensated; and (2) Citizens had actual or constructive knowledge of that policy and of the resulting uncompensated work.  See Kellar v. Summit Seating Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 177 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Reich v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 28 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th Cir. 1994)); see generally Davis v. Abington Memorial Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2014).  Thus, to satisfy the predominance inquiry, Plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) that Citizens’ conduct was common as to all of the class members, i.e., that Plaintiffs’ managers were carrying out a “common mode” of conduct vis-à-vis the company’s internal “policy-to-violate-the-policy,” and (2) that Citizens had actual or constructive knowledge of this conduct.  See Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 299; Dukes, 564 U.S. at 358; see also Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (explaining that, although a plaintiff’s suit may raise “important questions common to all class members,” class certification is proper only if proof of the essential elements of the class members’ claims does not involve “person-specific inquiries into individual work time [that] predominate over the common questions”).  

The Third Circuit’s holding that class and collective actions are sufficient different that it lacked jurisdiction over issues re the one even though it had jurisdiction over issues re the other firmly establishes a split among the Circuits on the issue. Interested readers may wish to check if either party seeks Supreme Court review.

Source: Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., case no. 17-3464 (3rd Cir. 12/31/19).

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DC Circuit affirms NLRB’s ruling that off-duty employees have protected right to picket near hospital entrance

Historically labor practitioners (and the NLRB and the courts) have analyzed picketing versus handbilling differently. As a general rule, handbilling (i.e., the distribution of literature) has been allowed in many circumstances where picketing (the holding of a picket sign) is not. For example, in hospitals, since the Board’s 1945 Republic Aviation decision, handbilling, like solicitation (verbal requests for support) has been presumptively permitted “outside of immediate patient-care areas, such as in hospital lounges and cafeterias … unless the hospital can demonstrate the need for the restriction ‘to avoid disruption of health-care operations or disturbance of patients.’” 

In this case, the NLRB extended that approach to picketing, and the D.C. Circuit has affirmed its approach. The DC Circuit cautioned that the employer might have been able to block the picketing if it could prove that the “likelihood” that the otherwise protected activities would disturb patients or disrupt patient care. 

It is likely that future courts (and the Board) will limit this ruling to its facts where:

  • Off-duty employees
  • Of a hospital
  • Wish to picket by merely “holding … picket signs—without any chanting, marching, or obstructing of passage”
  • In a manner where they stand “stationary” and do not patrol
  • In a location, which even if near the hospital entrance, does not impede pedestrians, traffic or other operations
  • And do so without the likelihood of disturbing patients or disrupting patient care.

Source: Capital Medical Center v. NLRB, (D.C. 8/10/18).

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DOL proposes to overhaul its overtime rules

The Department of Labor issued the much anticipated proposed revisions to its overtime regulations.

Proposed Increase To Minimum Guaranteed Salary For Exempt Employees

The proposals will increase the minimum guaranteed salary that (most) exempt employees must receive from $455 per week ($23,600 per year) to $679 per week ($35,308 per year).

The DOL anticipates this increase will result in 1-million currently exempt employees losing their overtime exemptions, in other words, having to be paid overtime. This compares to the Obama Administration’s 2016 proposal to increase the minimum salary to $913 per week ($47,476 per year), which was anticipated then to result in 4.6-million exempt employees losing their exemptions, in other words, having to be paid overtime.

Proposed Increase to Highly-Compensated Employees

The proposals will increase the minimum guaranteed salary for employees in the Highly-Compensated Exemption from $100,000 per year to $147,414 per year. The DOL anticipates this will convert 201,100 workers into non-exempt employees who must be paid overtime.

Inflationary Adjustments

In contrast with many commentators’ expectation, the proposed rule does not provide for automatic adjustments to the minimum salary to, for example, keep with inflation. Instead, the DOL proposes to revisit these numbers every 4 years through further rulemaking. 

Other Changes

Other proposed changes to the federal overtime rules include a proposal to, now, permit up to 10% of the required minimum salary to be satisfied by the payment of nondiscretionary bonuses and commissions:

(T)he Department proposes to permit nondiscretionary bonuses and incentive payments (including commissions) to satisfy up to 10 percent of the standard salary level test for the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions, provided that such bonuses or payments are paid annually or more frequently. Such payments may include, for example, nondiscretionary incentive bonuses tied to productivity and profitability.

The DOL also proposes that employers will be able to make a 1-time annual “catch-up” payment to ensure employees exceed the required minimum salary.

Finally, the Department proposes to permit employers to make a final “catch-up” payment within one pay period after the end of each 52-week period to bring an employee’s compensation up to the required level. Under the proposal, each pay period an employer must pay the exempt executive, administrative, or professional employee 90 percent of the standard salary level ($611.10 per week), and if at the end of the 52-week period the salary paid plus the nondiscretionary bonuses and incentive payments (including commissions) paid does not equal the standard salary level for 52 weeks ($35,308), the employer would have one pay period to make up or the shortfall (up to 10 percent of the standard salary level, $3,530.80). Any such catch-up payment would count only toward the prior year’s salary amount and not toward the salary amount in the year in which it was paid.

Anticipated Litigation

As with previous wage-hour regulatory proposals, these have already been greeted with numerous promises of litigation.

Comments

The DOL has invited comments from the public within a 60-day period.

Source: DOL’s proposed rule “Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees,” DOL RIN 1235-AA2 (3/7/19).

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognizes negligence tort for employer’s failure to protect private employee information

Employers are well aware of various statutory obligations that companies have to protect employee (and consumer) private information, including for example social security numbers, medical records, etc. One example is Colorado‘s relatively recent statute.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has extended statutory data privacy laws now, for companies in Pennsylvania, to be a common law principle. Even without — or in addition to — existing statutory data privacy laws and any contracts that the company may have entered into that promised data privacy protections, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that employers have a common law duty — as part of the duty not to engage in negligence — to use reasonable steps to protect the private information of its employees. It is not clear whether this duty extends to the private information stored for customers (and anyone else).

(W)e hold that an employer has a legal duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard its employees’ sensitive personal information stored by the employer on an internet-accessible computer system.

What specific steps should an employer take? The court did not say, but, in an aside, one comment from the court suggests that companies should consider, at the very least, “implementing adequate security measures to protect against data breaches, including encrypting data properly, establishing adequate firewalls, and implementing (an) adequate authentication protocol.”

Source: Dittman v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 196 A.3d 1036 (Penn. 11/21/18).

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