Tag Archive for: joint employer

NLRB joint employer rule frozen

In a case entitled Chamber of Commerce of USA v. NLRB, a federal court in Texas has struck the NLRB’s new joint employer rule. The court held that the NLRB’s new rule goes too far in that it permits evidence of indirect control alone to be sufficient to establish a joint employer relationship: “That would treat virtually every entity that contracts for labor as a joint employer because virtually every contract for third-party labor has terms that impact, at least indirectly, at least one of the specified ‘essential terms and conditions of employment.'”

NLRB returns to broad joint employment rule, narrowing availability of contractor usage

In a new regulatory rule, the NLRB has returned to a broad joint employer rule, which narrows the availability of contractor usage. The new rule no longer requires that a putative joint employer actually exercise control over the workers, now it returns to finding adequate potential, even never exercised control, based arguably even solely on a theoretical reading of the parties’ contracts and perhaps broader. The Board illustrates this in its new rule by expressly stating both “reserved” and “indirect” control will be sufficient to establish a joint employer relationship. The new rule looks to seven “essential” fact issues to be considered in the context of the putative joint employer’s involvement in the worker’s wages, hours and working conditions:

  1. wages, benefits, and other compensation;
  2. hours of work and scheduling;
  3. the assignment of duties to be performed;
  4. the supervision of the performance of duties;
  5. work rules and directions governing the manner, means, and methods of the performance of duties and the grounds for discipline;
  6. the tenure of employment, including hiring and discharge; and
  7. working conditions related to the safety and health of employees.

CDLE publishes searchable index of its citations and appeals

HR professionals and employment lawyers will have noticed that the CDLE has become increasingly active in Colorado employment law issues in recent years. Are you curious what the agency is actually doing as it enforces this crop of Colorado laws? The CDLE is helpfully publishing a searchable index of its citations and appeals.

Available keyword searches include the following:

Advances Business Closure Division Authority Final Wages Pay Periods Retaliation – PHEW Tip Posting Requirement
Agreed Wage/Rate Calculations of Wages/Hours Division Notices/Filings Fine Pay Statements Retaliation – Wages Tip Sharing / Notice Requirement
Alleged Waiver Commissions Draws Handbooks/Manuals Penalties Retaliation Only Tips/Gratuities
Apparent Authority Compensable Time Employee/Contractor Joint Employment Physical Disability Sub-minimum Wage Settlement Vacation Pay / PTO
Bankruptcy Compliance Order Employee/Volunteer Local Minimum Wage Records of Time Worked Sick Pay – 2020 Willful
Benefits COMPS EAP Duties Test Employer Coverage Meal Break/Meal Periods Reduction in Pay Sick Pay – After 2020
Bonuses COMPS Rest Periods Deductions Minimum Wage Reprisal Staffing/Temp Agencies
Bounced Check COMPS Tipped MW 80/20 application Employer Individual Liability Notice of Rights & Posters Retaliation – COMPS Statutory Interpretation
Breaks/Rest Periods Contract Equal Pay – Transparency Overtime Retaliation – HFWA Termination
Burden of Proof Direct Investigation Exemptions Paid Time Off (PTO) Retaliation – Other Third-Party Payments

An example of the kind of information that might be of interest to employers is this recent Notice of Fine For Non-Compliance With Division Orders And Order To Respond issued to one employer apparently based on the CDLE’s own review of the employer’s public job posting, in light of recent Colorado job-posting transparency requirements. There the CDLE discusses its view of specific posting requirements and the proper level of related fines.

The CDLE deserves credit for making this index available and searchable. Employers, individuals and their counsel will benefit from being able to search and find how the CDLE is applying the many laws it now has jurisdiction to enforce.

Tenth Circuit narrowly applies Joint Employer doctrine

In a narrow application of the Joint Employer doctrine, the Tenth Circuit rejected claims of sexual harassment by the plaintiff who worked for a construction and maintenance company that had contracted with another company. She claimed that three of the employees of that other company sexually harassed her. Since that other company was not her actual employer, she claimed it was nonetheless liable as a Joint Employer along with her actual employer.

She claimed that the other company’s workers frequently told her what to do and how to do it. She claimed that she believed that they had the authority to fire her or at least have her fired if she did not follow their direction. The Tenth Circuit rejected her claims holding that “even if (she) believed that (the other company’s employees) could fire her, her statements do not support the claim that (they) had such authority.” The Court noted that the other evidence showed that other company did not hav ethe authority to fire her, discipline her, determine her pay. It did not oversee her payroll taxes.

Her statement that Plains Defendants supervised some aspects of her work would not, under Knitter or New Mexico state law, overcome the overwhelming evidence that C3 was an independent contractor. In short, even if discovery could substantiate every assertion 41 in Ms. Adams’s affidavit, Plains Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment under Knitter and New Mexico state law.

 

 

DOL final rules re gig workers and other independent contractors, likely DOA

In an apparently symbolic statement, the DOL issued its long-waited final rule re gig workers and other independent contractors. The rule purports to provide clearer, more pro-business provisions regarding independent contractor classifications. The DOL has summarized its final rule, as follows:

In the final rule, the Department:

  • Reaffirms an “economic reality” test to determine whether an individual is in business for him or herself (independent contractor) or is economically dependent on a potential employer for work (FLSA employee).
  • Identifies and explains two “core factors” that are most probative to the question of whether a worker is economically dependent on someone else’s business or is in business for him or herself:
    • The nature and degree of control over the work.
    • The worker’s opportunity for profit or loss based on initiative and/or investment.
  • Identifies three other factors that may serve as additional guideposts in the analysis, particularly when the two core factors do not point to the same classification. The factors are:
    • The amount of skill required for the work.
    • The degree of permanence of the working relationship between the worker and the potential employer.
    • Whether the work is part of an integrated unit of production.
  • The actual practice of the worker and the potential employer is more relevant than what may be contractually or theoretically possible.
  • Provides six fact-specific examples applying the factors.

However, the DOL waited too long to issue its final rule for it to become effective. The regulatory rulemaking process provides that such rules do not become effective until at least 60 days following their publication (this rule was published 1/6/2021). In the interim President Elect Joe Biden will be inaugurated. The incoming Biden Administration has already announced that it will immediately freeze this and any other so-called “midnight” regulations. It is not clear why the Trump Administration, knowing the rulemaking process, chose to wait too long to issue this rule.

CDLE finalizes crop of new rules

The Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (CDLE) has finalized a half dozen rules on a wide array of topics. Employers should take care to immediately familiarize themselves with these rules, as many take effect January 1, 2021. The rules can be found on the CDLE’s rulemaking page, where the CDLE summarizes its new rules with the following table that contains links to the actual rules themselves:

Adopted Rules Clean Version Redline Version Statement of Basis & Purpose

State Labor Relations Rules, 7 CCR 1103-12

PDF PDF PDF
Colorado Whistleblower, Anti-retaliation, Non-interference, and Notice-giving (Colorado WARNING) Rules, 7 CCR 1103-11 PDF PDF PDF
Direct Investigations Rules, 7 CCR 1103-8 PDF PDF PDF
Equal Pay Transparency Rules, 7 CCR 1103-13 PDF PDF PDF
Colorado Overtime and Minimum Pay Standards (COMPS) Order #37, 7 CCR 1103-1 PDF PDF PDF
Wage Protection Rules, 7 CCR 1103-7 PDF PDF PDF

Individuals interested in receiving updates from the CDLE directly when it engages in the rulemaking process, may subscribe with the CDLE here.

Look for follow-up posts on this blog highlighting some of the key developments in some of these rules.

“Vertical” component of DOL Joint Employer rule struck

A New York court has struck the “vertical” component of the DOL’s recent Joint Employer rule, ruling it is invalid as “arbitrary and capricious.”

To be clear, the Department’s justifications for engaging in rulemaking are valid. Promoting uniformity and clarity given the (at least superficially) [parenthetical in original] widely divergent tests for joint employer liability in different circuits is a worthwhile objective. The Court is sympathetic to the Department’s concern that putative joint employers face uncertainty, and that this uncertainty is costly. This opinion does not imply that the Department cannot engage in rulemaking to try to harmonize joint employer standards.
But the Department must do better than this. Any future rulemaking must adhere to the text of the FLSA and Supreme Court precedent. If the Department departs from its prior interpretation, it must explain why. And it must make more than a perfunctory attempt to consider important costs, including costs to workers, and explain why the benefits of the new rule outweigh those costs. Because the Final Rule does none of these things, it is legally infirm.

An example of “vertical” joint employment is when a worker is an employee of one company — for example a staffing agency — that in turn is a contractor to another company. Vertical joint employment is distinguished from “horizontal” joint employment where the person is employed by one company to work for both it and, for example, its sister corporation. The court emphasized its ruling did not question the DOL’s final rule as far as it applied to horizontal employment.

Source: State of New York v. Scalia, case no. 1:20-cv-01689 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 26, 2020).

California sues Uber and Lyft alleging driver misclassification

In furtherance of California’s AB 5, the State of California has sued Uber and Lyft, seeking to re-characterize their drivers as employees, not independent contractors. The State summarized its case in the introductory paragraphs of its Complaint, as follows:

5. Uber and Lyft are transportation companies in the business of selling rides to customers, and their drivers are the employees who provide the rides they sell.  The fact that Uber and Lyft communicate with their drivers by using an app does not suddenly strip drivers of their fundamental rights as employees.

6. But rather than own up to their legal responsibilities, Uber and Lyft have worked relentlessly to find a work-around.  They lobbied for an exemption to A.B. 5, but the Legislature declined.  They utilize driver contracts with mandatory arbitration and class action waiver provisions to stymie private enforcement of drivers’ rights.  And now, even amid a once-in-a century pandemic, they have gone to extraordinary lengths to convince the public that their unlawful misclassification scheme is in the public interest.  Both companies have launched an aggressive public relations campaign in the hopes of enshrining their ability to mistreat their workers, all while peddling the lie that driver flexibility and worker protections are somehow legally incompatible.

7. Uber’s and Lyft’s motivation for breaking the law is simple: by misclassifying their drivers, Uber and Lyft do not “bear any of [the] costs or responsibilities” of complying with the law.  (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 913.)  When addressing investors, Uber pulls no punches:  “Our business would be adversely affected if Drivers were classified as employees instead of independent contractors.”  (Uber Securities and Exchange Com. (“SEC”) S-1, p. 28 [Filing Date: April 11, 2019].)

8. As one federal district judge recently observed: “[R]ather than comply with a clear legal obligation, companies like Lyft are thumbing their noses at the California Legislature . . . .”  (Rogers v. Lyft (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020, No. 20-CV-01938-VC) ___ F.Supp.3d ___ [2020 WL 16484151, at *2].) 9. The State’s laws against employee misclassification protect all Californians.  They protect workers by ensuring they receive the compensation and benefits they have earned through the dignity of their labor.  (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 952.)   They protect “law-abiding” businesses from “unfair competition,” and prevent the “race to the bottom” that occurs when businesses adopt “substandard wages” and “unhealthy [working] conditions,” threatening jobs and worker protections across entire industries.  (Id. at pp. 952, 960.)  They protect the tax-paying public, who is often called upon to “assume responsibility” for “the ill effects to workers and their families” of exploitative working arrangements.  (Id. at p. 952-53.)  They are a lifeline and bulwark for the People against the “erosion of the middle class and the rise in income inequality.”  (A.B. 5, § 1(c).) 10. The time has come for Uber’s and Lyft’s massive, unlawful employee misclassification schemes to end.  The People bring this action to ensure that Uber and Lyft ridehailing drivers—the lifeblood of these companies—receive the full compensation, protections, and benefits they are guaranteed under law, to restore a level playing field for competing businesses, and to preserve jobs and hard-won worker protections for all Californians.

The Complaint seeks to have Uber and Lyft’s drivers re-classified as employees, not independent contractors, the imposition of statutory penalties, and an open-ended to-be-proved basket of remedies involving “minimum wages, overtime wages, business expenses, meal and rest periods, wage statements, paid sick leave and health benefits, and social insurance programs.”

Although the drivers at-issue may have entered into arbitration agreements, it is anticipated the State’s lawsuit will not be subject to arbitration because, in this case, it is the State that has filed suit, and the State was not party to the driver arbitration agreements.

CDLE issues revised Wage Protection Act Rules

On March 16, 2020, the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (CDLE) issued amendments, effective that same day, to its prior Wage Protection Act Rules. The amendments added language that articulated the CDLE’s opinion that Colorado state law on the Joint Employer doctrine is and, in its opinion, has always been contrary to federal law.

COMPS Order 36 takes effect with some changes

Colorado Overtime and Minimum Pay Standards (COMPS) Order 36 took effect March 16, 2020 with some revisions and additional commentary by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment.

First, in another Statement of Basis, Purpose, Specific Statutory Authority, and Findings for Adoption as Temporary or Emergency Rules, the CDLE issued a multi-page detailed explanation of its opinion that Colorado state wage-hour law on the Joint Employer doctrine is and, in its further opinion, has been contrary to and stricter than federal law. The CDLE announced there it will soon commence regulatory rulemaking on the Joint Employer doctrine to further solidify its reading of Colorado state wage-hour law.

The Statement also clarified what information needs to be included in paycheck statement eliminating prior proposed requirements that CDLE concedes “make() no sense.”

In an email to stakeholders distributing the revisions on March 16, 2020, the CDLE also advised of grace periods it will permit in light of the on-going coronavirus events, as follows:

(B)       Division Operations, and Compliance Grace Periods

            As of now, the Division remains fully operational. Based in part on potential delays to employer internal operations that have been called to the Division’s attention, the Division has adopted the following policies to grant what leniency it can, within the confines of existing law, for the coming weeks.

(1)   COMPS-required paperwork (posters, handbook inserts, acknowledgements, etc.) – compliance by 4/16/20 will be sufficient. To the extent that COMPS requires new paperwork from employers (new posters, handbook inserts, acknowledgement forms, etc.), the Division will deem compliance within the first month of COMPS – i.e., by April 16th – to be sufficient to qualify as compliant.

(2)   No Division-initiated investigations of new COMPS rules until 4/16/20. While the Division by statute must investigate any claims filed with us, the Division’s “Direct Investigations” team launches its own investigations, based on tips, leads, and known problem sectors. For the first month of COMPS being in effect (i.e., until April 16th), Direct Investigations will not launch new investigations based on violations of new COMPS rules.

(3)   Deeming violations of new COMPS provisions rules non-willful if remedied by 4/16/20. As noted above, the Division cannot by statute reject a claim filed shortly after COMPS takes effect. But to the extent that a violation committed within the first month of COMPS is solely of a new obligation under COMPS, the Division will deem the violation not “willful” if the employer remedies it within the first month of COMPS – i.e., by April 16th.

(4)   Starting tomorrow, March 17th, no new “notices of claim” will be sent to employers until April 1st. This is for all wage claims, not just those related to COMPS. Because some employers may be currently struggling to keep up with mail receipt, the Division will postpone mailing any new “notice of claim” – the mailing that tells an employer that a claim has been filed against it – because by statute, a notice of claim starts a 14-day clock for the employer to avoid penalties by paying any wages due. A longer extension would risk backlogging claims, but the Division aims for this period of just over two weeks to postpone employers’ receipt of mail that starts a statutory deadline.

COMPS Order 36, SOME of what you need to know

As previously posted here, the Colorado Division of Labor and Employment has issued its COMPS Order no. 36. Here’s some of what you need to know:

  • It probably applies to your company. As previously explained, Colorado Wage Orders have historically been limited to certain industries, now their successor, this “COMPS Order” is generally applicable to all employers with only some exceptions, most notably some aspects of the agricultural industry.
  • It’s long, but you should take the time to read it and review it with experienced employment counsel. If you read the draft, the CDLE published a redline with changes from the draft to the final version.
  • It will be effective March 16, 2020.
  • Ensure your overtime-exempt personnel still qualify for exemption under Colorado law, especially that each is earning more than the required minimum salaries, effective the following dates:

July 1, 2020 $684.00 per week ($35,568 per year)
January 1, 2021 $778.85 per week ($40,500 per year)
January 1, 2022 $865.38 per week ($45,000 per year)
January 1, 2023 $961.54 per week ($50,000 per year)
January 1, 2024 $1,057.69 per week ($55,000 per year)

Effective January 1, 2025, the CDLE advises that salary minimums will increase commensurate with Colorado’s minimum wage, as adjusted by the CPI.

  • Employers must now “authorize and permit” non-exempt workers to take at least one 10-minute paid break as close to the middle of each 4-hour shift. What does “authorize and permit” mean? No one knows, and worse, the phrase is not defined elsewhere in the law. Some options employers might consider, in an abundance of caution, include requiring employees take such breaks, disciplining employees who fail to do so and requiring employees to mark down their break times on timecards even though such time must be paid.
    • Note: The COMPS order has different break requirements for employers that have contrary union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements and some Medicaid-funded service providers.
  • Employers must now pay for certain pre- and post-shift activities, which federal law does not consider compensable time, to include some aspects of time related to donning and doffing (changing in and out of certain clothes and gear), briefings, security screenings, safety and travel-related time, and clocking-in and -out.
  • Companies that use independent contractors in their workforce will want to review this blog’s previous post, as COMPS Order 36, as explained by its Statement of Basis, Purpose, Specific Statutory Authority, and Findings in support of COMPS Order #36, seems to have dramatically narrowed the ability of companies to do so, apparently in an attempt to convert such workers, by administrative fiat, into statutory “employees” of joint employers.
  • COMPS Order 36 has revised the definitions for which salaried personnel may be exempt. Employers should review their current exemptions against this new law. Notably, COMPS Order 36 actually expands the availability of exemptions in some instances for computer professionals and some seasonal camp and outdoor education programs.
  • Post the CDLE’s new COMPS Order 36 poster. Indeed the new poster is so new, that the CDLE hasn’t issued one yet. Recently on a call to CDLE the CDLE advised that it does not know when or if it will issue the poster it refers to itself in its own new order.
    • Not only must it be posted, but the poster or the entire COMPS Order itself must be included in handbooks and signed for.
    • And that non-existent poster and expansive COMPS order must be so distributed not only in English but in Spanish or such other language as workers may speak. Although the COMPS Order suggest the CDLE will distribute the order in such other languages, there are none on CDLE’s website.
  • As noted, review this expansive order in its entirety. Other provisions for example address meal, lodging, top credit, uniform deposits.

DOL releases final joint employer rule

The DOL has issued a final rule regarding the Joint Employer doctrine.

Analysis of a joint employer issues under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the DOL rule says, should start — and will generally end — with the following non-exclusive four factors (quoting the summary in the DOL’s Fact Sheet regarding its new rule):

  • hires or fires the employee;

  • supervises and controls the employee’s work schedule or conditions of employment to a substantial degree;

  • determines the employee’s rate and method of payment; and

  • maintains the employee’s employment records.

The rule emphasizes that no one factor will be controlling and specifically states that the fourth (maintaining employment records) alone will never be sufficient to establish joint employer status. This is a particularly important principle for companies — like franchisors for example — that mandate the use of a software platform hosted by the principle company to encompass a variety of operational needs that include scheduling and HRIS.

The rule eliminates the prior “economic dependence” test that has proven so controversial. Likewise the rule specifies that the worker’s ability to recognize an independent profit or loss is not to be considered. The rule states that, under its application, franchisors, among others, will generally no longer be considered joint employers.  Indeed the rule states that the following are not to be considered indicators of joint employer status (again quoting the DOL’s own summary at its Fact Sheet, above):

  • operating as a franchisor or entering into a brand and supply agreement, or using a similar business model;

  • the potential joint employer’s contractual agreements with the employer requiring the employer to comply with its legal obligations or to meet certain standards to protect the health or safety of its employees or the public;

  • the potential joint employer’s contractual agreements with the employer requiring quality control standards to ensure the consistent quality of the work product, brand, or business reputation; and

  • the potential joint employer’s practice of providing the employer with a sample employee handbook, or other forms, allowing the employer to operate a business on its premises (including “store within a store” arrangements), offering an association health plan or association retirement plan to the employer or participating in such a plan with the employer, jointly participating in an apprenticeship program with the employer, or any other similar business practice.

Additional information, including a FAQ, is available on the DOL’s web page regarding its new rule.

Source: DOL final rule, “Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,” 85 Fed.Reg. 164 et seq. (1/16/20).

DOL proposes overhaul of Joint Employer rules

Following up on recent efforts by the NLRB to overhaul the Joint Employer doctrine, the DOL has proposed its own revisions.

Like the NLRB, the DOL proposes that the right to control not be considered, but rather that focus be on whether the putative joint employer actually has exercised control.

Only actions taken with respect to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment, rather than the theoretical ability to do so under a contract, are relevant to joint employer status under the Act.

Additionally, the DOL proposes to clarify that “whether an employee is economically dependent on the potential joint employer is (also) not relevant.”

Rather, the DOL suggests that four factors be considered to determine whether the putative joint employer exercised sufficient control, in actuality, to warrant liability:

The Department’s proposed test would assess whether the potential joint employer:

  • Hires or fires the employee;

  • Supervises and controls the employee’s work schedule or conditions of employment;

  • Determines the employee’s rate and method of payment; and

  • Maintains the employee’s employment records.

Source: DOL proposed rules re “Joint Employer Status Under The Fair Labor Standards Act,” 29 CFR Part 791, RIN 1235-aa26 (4/1/19).

D.C. Circuit confusingly has affirmed the Obama Board’s Joint Employer doctrine

The D.C. Circuit has affirmed the Obama Board’s Joint Employer doctrine, which holds that “indirect” control is sufficient to establish Joint Employer status. The rule has proven to be exceptionally controversial and politically sensitive, so much so that the Trump Board has already announced it will be issuing a formal regulatory rule to address the issue.

While the dissent in the D.C. case would have preferred to remand the case and let the Board issue its own rule, the majority decided to tackle the issue head on, or nearly so, or actually not at all head on. Rather the D.C. Circuit’s decision has left employers, unions and individuals more confused than ever over the current status of the law.

The majority held that, as a general principle, the Obama Board had been within its rights to re-articulate the Joint Employer rule in a way that made “indirect” control sufficient to establish Joint Employer status.

We hold that the right-to-control element of the Board’s joint-employer standard has deep roots in the common law. The common law also permits consideration of those forms of indirect control that play a relevant part in determining the essential terms and conditions of employment. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s articulation of the joint-employer test as including consideration of both an employer’s reserved right to control and its indirect control over employees’ terms and conditions of employment.

What exactly is “indirect” control? That’s been the issue throughout the evolution of this controversial issue, and unfortunately the D.C. Circuit offered no guidance. It simply chided the Board for not, itself, having offered such “legal scaffolding” and suggested that an appropriate standard will somehow distinguish between control over the “matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment” versus “those types of employer decisions that set the objectives, basic ground rules, and expectations for a third-party contractor.”

Employers, unions and individuals are left now to wait for the NLRB to issue its own rule. When the NLRB develops its own rule, one thing seems clear from the D.C. Circuit’s decision, it cannot simply ignore “indirect” control.

A categorical rule against even considering indirect control—no matter how extensively the would-be employer exercises determinative or heavily influential pressure and control over all of a worker’s working conditions—would allow manipulated form to flout reality.

NLRB proposes rule to reverse Obama-era Joint Employer standard

As explained in earlier posts, the Board’s Obama-era decision in Browning Ferris, revising its Joint Employer standard, has proven exceptionally controversial. At the close of 2017, the Board voted, in Hy-Brand, to reverse Browning Ferris, but that decision was rendered unenforceable when Board Member Emanuel was ruled to have had a conflict.

Now, the NLRB has issued proposed regulations that will do what it would have done by decision in Hy-Brand, namely, return the Board to the pre-Browning Ferris Joint Employer standard, which had required proof that a purported joint employer has actually exercised “direct and immediate” control. Under this new rule, if made final, even contract provisions that reserve to a company the possibility of control would not be sufficient to establish a joint employer relationship, nor would limited or routine involvement in operational matters. Rather, to be a joint employer under the proposed rule, a company would have to be proven to have actively involved itself in hiring, firing, discipline, supervision and the direction of workers.

The Joint Employer doctrine has importance for any company that uses independent contractors, which is virtually every company, and has been especially significant to companies whose very business models involve the use of contractors, including franchisors and gig economy companies.

Source: NLRB, “The Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status,” 83 Fed.Reg. 46681 (9/14/18).

Troubled by NLRB Member Emanuel’s recusal in Hy-Brand?

If, like many, you are troubled by the recent recusal of NLRB Member Emanuel from the Hy-Brand case, you might want to read an article in the latest newsletter by the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section.

What’s Hy-Brand? Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, 365 NLRB No. 186 (2015), was a decision by the NLRB under President Trump. It overruled Browning-Ferris Industries, 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015), which had been a decision by the NLRB under President Obama. In Browning-Ferris the Obama Board expanded the joint employer standard. The case set off a political firestorm. Thus it was no surprise when the Trump Board, in Hy-Brand, reversed Browning-Ferris, returning the Board to its prior approach to joint employers.

How did Member Emanuel end up being recused, and what did that mean for Hy-Brand? After Hy-Brand was announced, the Board’s own Inspector General called a foul on the play. The Inspector General opined that Member Emanuel should have recused himself from the decision because, it contended, he had a conflict of interest. With his vote subtracted, the Board was left split 2-2, effectively nullifying Hy-Brand and keeping Browning Ferris in place.

What was Member Emanuel’s conflict? This is where the case takes a sharp turn around President Trump’s own policies. Member Emanuel himself had no actual conflict. But for the Trump Administration’s own policies, the Trump Board’s vote in Hy-Brand would have stood. The conflict was imputed to Member Emanuel because he, like many NLRB Members, came from a large law firm. On the union side, it’s common for NLRB Members to come from large unions. It’s not uncommon therefore for Board Members to be called upon to decide cases that involve legal issues their prior law firm/union/company may have argued. In fact, it’s not just not uncommon, it’s expected. Nonetheless, the Inspector General imputed a conflict to Board Member Emanuel because his prior law firm had handled a matter involving the joint employer issue. It should be noted it did not involve the same parties, or the same evidence, simply the same legal issue. Normally that would not be enough to create a conflict, and even now it arguably should not be enough, but in this particular instance, at this particular time, it was, because, the Inspector General pointed out, the Trump Administration has required its appointees to agree to a voluntary ethics pledge (Executive Order 13770) that prohibits them from participating in “any particular matter involving specific parties that is directly and substantially related to (their) former employer or former clients” during the first two years of government service.

Source: “The NLRB Recusal Standard: How Will Hy-Brand, The Inspector General, and a Federal Regulation Affect Employees and Employers?,” G. Enis and S. Hamilton, American Bar Association Labor and Employment Law Section newsletter, vol. 46, no. 4 (Summer 2018).

Joint Employer rule coming from NLRB?

The NLRB’s approach to the Joint Employer doctrine has proven exceedingly controversial. The NLRB’s approach has sparked similar controversy in both the courts and at the D.O.L. Soon, more fuel will be added to the political fires. The N.L.R.B. announced its intent to publish a proposed joint employer rule. What’s it likely to say? Stay tuned. IT is likely to continue the Board’s rollback against the Obama-era Board’s Joint Employer approach. Some recent developments at the Board suggest some possibilities. The draft rule is expected this summer. At that point, the Board advises it will follow formal administrative rulemaking procedures, which will include a comment period.

Source: NLRB news release (6/5/18), disclosing an otherwise unpublished letter by NLRB Chairman to certain Senators.

NLRB holds hotel owner REIT liable as a “statutory employer” for otherwise lawful lawsuit against union

Companies that own properties, such as hotels, may find themselves being damaged by the activities of unions who represent or seek to represent workers on the property, even workers who are employed by other companies. Such property owners may have legal rights at-issue and may sue unions and workers for violation of those rights. However, in response, unions and workers can file charges at the NLRB alleging that the real reason for the lawsuit was to retaliate for lawfully protected concerted activities.  That kind of NLRB charge is often called a Bill Johnson charge after the Supreme Court case recognizing the theory behind such a charge. The NLRB will permit a Bill Johnson charge even when it was proven in the underlying lawsuit that the union had violated the property owner’s rights. In a recent decision, the NLRB revisited multiple doctrines involved with that kind of scenario.

As an initial matter, the hotel owner argued before the NLRB that it was not subject to the National Labor Relations Act because it was not the “employer” of the workers, it had no collective bargaining relationship with their union. Indeed it was undisputed that the company, being a REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust), could not have employed the workers. The Board rejected the argument finding that the owner was a “statutory employer,” subject to the NLRA, along with the operator that actually employed the workers. First the Board held the owner had “a significant financial interest in the hotel’s profitability.” More importantly the operator was an affiliate of the hotel owner; it was owned by two of the same individuals who were owners in the REIT/property owner. And, perhaps most importantly to the Board, the REIT/property owner had a management agreement with the operator, in which it required the operator to consult with it over personnel matters, including wages.

Next, the Board rejected the hotel owner’s argument that it had a meritorious basis for its lawsuit against the union. The Board explained that whether the owner’s lawsuit against the union had a “reasonable basis” or not was simply not an issue in the case. The Board said that its “reasonable basis” test did not apply where, as here, the owner’s lawsuit had been directed specifically at activity protected by the NLRA. Here, the REIT/property owner’s lawsuit was, the Board held, entirely focused on the union’s boycott and related activities and speech by the Union and the workers. In so holding, the Board distinguished cases where the underlying lawsuit had targeted unprotected activities, such as defamatory statements made with malice, threats to the public order, or violence. Finally the Board held, that even if the “reasonable basis” test applied, it would not find the underlying lawsuit as having had a reasonable basis.

The decision is a sharp reminder that the NLRB may punish companies who exercise their otherwise lawful right to pursue litigation against a union. The Board’s ruling that a “reasonable basis” for the underlying lawsuit is not a defense arguably has increased the potential for future Bill Johnson charges.

Source: Ashford TRS Nickel, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 6 (2/1/18).

NLRB reverses Obama-era joint employer doctrine

Continuing its trend of reversing Obama-era NLRB decisions, the Trump Board has reversed one of the most controversial, the Board’s 2015 decision, Browning-Ferris Industries, in which the Board had held that mere proof of indirect or even potential control was sufficient to create a joint employer relationship. In this decision, Hy-Brand Industry Contracts, Ltd., the Board returns to requiring proof of actual control by the putative joint employer.

The impact of the Board’s decision on the pending legislation regarding the Joint Employer doctrine, previously reported in this blog is yet to be determined.

Source: Hy-Brand Industry Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 (12/14/17).

UPDATE: On February 26, 2018, the Board vacated the foregoing decision in Hy-Brand due to a purported conflict of interest bearing upon one of its members. On June 5, 2018, the Board announced it will, instead, issue a proposed rule addressing the Joint Employer doctrine. On June 6, 2018, the Board then refused to reinstate the foregoing decision, apparently leaving the issue instead to be determined as part of the forthcoming rulemaking process.

NLRB General Counsel issues memo outlining likely reversals to Obama-era precedents

As previously reported here in this blog, the Trump Board (NLRB Boards are often colloquially but not pejoratively referred to by the President during their term) has begun overruling Obama-era precedents. Further reversals are anticipated. Curious which Obama-era NLRB precedents are likely to be reversed?

NLRB General Counsel Robb issued a controversial memo, shortlisting the cases he thinks most warrant attention. Indeed to call it a shortlist is a stretch. The General Counsel lists 26 categories, that range from employee access to email, to protections for section 7 rights, obscene and harassing behavior, off-duty access to property, the Weingarten right to have a representative present, rights of employees during contract negotiations, successorship and of course the joint employer doctrine, unilateral changes consistent with past practice, information requests during the processing of a grievance, dues check-offs, remedies, deferral, and, well, the list goes on, as will employers’ need to stay tuned to forthcoming developments at the Board.

Source: NLRB General Counsel Memorandum GC 18-02.

House passes Joint Employer bill

In previous posts, this blog has reported on legislative efforts to limit the NLRB’s joint employer approach. The House has voted to pass its bill, HB 3441, which now proceeds to the Senate, where supporters will need to find at least 8 Democrats to overcome anticipated filibuster.

Source: E:\BILLS\H3441.RH

Joint Employer bill moves forward, towards an unclear future

The House Education and the Workforce Committee approved the Save Local Business Act (H.R.3441) moving it forward towards a potential floor vote before the House. As explained in a previous post, the Bill will reverse the NLRB’s 2015 joint employer standard. No sister bill has been introduced in the Senate, and it is unclear whether such a bill could muster sufficient votes to withstand a filibuster in the Senate.

Source: H.R.3441 – 115th Congress (2017-2018): Save Local Business Act | Congress.gov | Library of Congress

Congress Takes Shot at Browning-Farris – Law Week Colorado

Interested in reading Bill Berger‘s thoughts about Congress’ efforts to reverse Obama-era expansions of the Joint Employer doctrine, especially H.R. 3441 (which if passed would be the Save Local Business Act)? Check out the August 7, 2017 issue of Law Week Colorado. If passed, the Act would tighten the application of the Joint Employer doctrine (back) to requiring evidence of actual control by the purported joint employer in cases involving the National Labor Relations Act or the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Source: Congress Takes Shot at Browning-Farris – Law Week Colorado

Trouble for the NLRB’s joint employer doctrine? 

The NLRB famously expanded its joint employer doctrine in its 2015 Browning-Ferris decision. There, the Board effectively eliminated the requirement that a company have actual control to be a joint employer, in other words, it eliminated its decades old “direct and immediate” control requirement. Instead it can be enough now — at least according to the Board — if the company has “reserved” some form of control, that isn’t exercised, even if “indirect.” The Board’s ruling in Browning-Ferris is currently on appeal at the DC Circuit.

Unwilling to wait for a decision, Congress is considering a House Bill, the Save Local Business Act, that would jettison the NLRB’s “reserved” or “indirect” standard and reinstate the “direct and immediate” standard, not only for purposes of the NLRA (the federal labor law governing union relatioins) but also the FLSA (the federal wage-hour law).

Here the DC Circuit considered a slightly different aspect of the NLRB’s new joint employer doctrine (its “share or codetermine” standard). While the DC Circuit went out of its way to say it was expressing no opinion on the Browning-Ferris issue (“direct and immediate”), it held the Board had improperly laxened its “share or codetermine” caselaw, reversed and remanded the case to the Board to reconsider.

Source: NLRB v. CNN Am. Inc.

IRS outlines strict rules for PEOs that handle federal employment tax withholdings, reporting and payment for companies

PEOs (Professional Employer Organizations have become an attractive alternative for many companies to administering their own payroll and benefits systems. Many PEOs also handle routine HR functions. The PEO effectively hires the company’s workers and becomes their employer of record.

The IRS has issued a new set of rules that tighten up on a PEO’s ability to become and stay certified (a “CPEO,” Certified Professional Employer Organization).

Companies utilizing PEOs should consider requiring, as part of their contract with the PEO, that the PEO be and remain a CPEO.

The IRS guidance is Revenue Procedure 2017-14.