Employers should begin preparing to turn over EEO-1 pay data by September 30, 2019, details to follow from EEOC shortly

A federal trial court judge in the District of Columbia cleared the path for the EEOC controversial rule requiring employers to turn over two years of pay data by September 30, 2019. The court’s order follows a recent decision in which the judge provided further reasoning. In short the court held that, in this battle between two federal agencies (the EEOC and the OMB), the Trump administration’s OMB had failed to establish a basis for freezing the Obama-era EEOC’s pay-data collection rule. That Obama-era rule (2016) added to the longstanding workforce data requirements for an EEO-1 (which the EEOC now calls the “Component 1” data requirements), a requirement to submit pay data as well designed to demonstrate pay gaps related to gender, race, and ethnicity (now called the “Component 2” data requirements).

Which two years of data will be required and when can an employer start submitting its EEO-1? The judge gave the EEOC leeway to decide, but ordered it to post on its website an initial decision by April 29 and the final decision on May 3. The EEOC’s website states it is already “working diligently on next steps in the wake of the court’s order.” The EEOC notes its portal for submission of Component 1 data is already open.

Employers will want to visit the EEOC’s website following April 29 and again following May 3, at least, for further information on this breaking development.

New Jersey Adds And Expands On State Laws Banning Non-Disclosure Provisions

Following up on developments in California and New York, as well as under the federal tax code, New Jersey has banned nondisclosure provisions, a/k/a confidentiality provisions, in agreements, including employment agreements and settlement agreements, that would prohibit disclosure of allegations related not only to sexual harassment but also discrimination, retaliation and other forms of prohibited harassment.

Source: New Jersey Senate Bill S121.

Gossip, sexual harassment and hostile work environments

A recent Fourth Circuit decision reminds employers to be vigilant in preventing sexually hostile work environments in the workplace. Even gossip can lead to such claims.

In this case, the plaintiff alleged that, when she received a series of promotions, her male co-worker started a rumor that she’d had an affair with a manager. She alleged that other co-workers, including males, continued to spread the rumor. She alleged that, as a result of the rumor, she was frozen out of future promotions and meetings.

The trial court dismissed her case saying she had failed to allege this rumor was due to her being a woman and further that she’d failed to allege it was so bad as to be “severe or pervasive” as required for a hostile work environment claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed on both grounds.

First, the Fourth Circuit held that the rumor was precisely due to her gender. It was sexual in nature and, by essentially asserting that she, as a woman, would not have been promoted otherwise, it was also unlawful sex stereotyping.

Thus, the dichotomy that RCSI, as well as the district court, purports to create between harassment “based on gender” and harassment based on “conduct” is not meaningful in this case because the conduct is also alleged to be gender-based. We conclude that, in overlooking this, the district court erred.

Next, the Fourth Circuit held the impact of the rumor was indeed “sever or pervasive” as required to prove a hostile work environment claim. It was more than “a few slights.” It wasn’t mere gossip in that, at points, it allegedly included “physical threatening.” It affected her work and, she claimed, even cost her the job.

Finally, the harassment interfered with Parker’s work. She was blamed for bringing the controversy to the workplace; she was excluded from an all-staff meeting; she was humiliated in front of coworkers; she was adversely affected in her ability to carry out management responsibility over her subordinates; she was restrained in where she could work, being told to stay away from the rumormonger; and she was told she had no future at RCSI because of the rumor. In addition, she alleges that her employment was terminated because of the rumor and, as stated by management, because of the rumormonger’s complaint. In short, RCSI’s management’s entire relationship with Parker, as well as Parker’s employment status, was changed substantially for the worse.

The case is a strong reminder to employers to prevent sexual harassment, even in the form of “mere” gossip. It should be noted though that as the court emphasized the case involved substantially more than what might be called simple gossip. Whether less substantial allegations would have warranted dismissal is for a later case to determine.

Source: Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc., case no. 18-1206 (4th Cir. 2/8/19).

Unions unable to charge lobbying costs to dues protesters, rules NLRB

In another setback to unions, the NLRB held that unions cannot charge lobbying costs to dues protesters.

In the NLRB’s terminology, a dues protestor is called a “Beck objector,” after the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Communication Workers v. Beck. There, the Supreme Court held that workers in a unionized workplace have the right to refuse to pay full union dues; instead, a so-called Beck objector can insist on paying only the share of dues that funds negotiating, administering and fighting grievances under his/her own collective bargaining agreement. Unions, therefore, set a fee rate that is lower than full dues, and must provide Beck objectors the calculations that show they are charging only Beck fees.

In this case, the Board held, first, that unions must provide those calculations to Beck objectors in the form a verified audit letter from the union’s auditor.

Next the Board turned to the union’s lobbying expenses. In this case, the union spent money to lobby state legislatures in support of legislative activity that it felt behooved its bargaining unit members, not just at this contract, but for all its members. The Board held that none of the lobbying efforts could be charged to Beck objectors.

Consistent with these cases, we conclude that lobbying expenses are not chargeable to Beck objectors under the NLRA.  We accordingly find that the Union violated its duty of fair representation by charging nonmember objectors for expenses incurred as to any of the lobbying activities at issue.

The case deals a heavy blow to unions, which frequently undertake significant lobbying efforts on behalf of their bargaining unit members.

Source: United Nurses and Allied Professionals, 367 NLRB No. 94 (3/1/19).

DOL confirms that employers may claim tip credit even for time tipped employees spend on non-tipped work

Confirming an approach announced in a recent opinion letter, the DOL has amended its Field Handbook, the manual for its enforcement personnel, that employers (like restaurants) may claim a tip credit for time that tipped employees spend on non-tipped work (such as a waiter who may vacuum) if performed contemporaneously (or nearly so) with tipped customer duties.

An employer may take a tip credit for any amount of time that an employee spends on related, non-tipped duties performed contemporaneously with the tipped duties—or for a reasonable time immediately before or after performing the tipped duties—regardless whether those duties involve direct customer service.

As explained in two recent blog posts, this lifts the DOL’s Obama-era 80-20 rule for tipped employees.

Source: DOL Field Assistance Bulletin 2019-2 (2/15/19).