Tag Archive for: sexual orientation

SCOTUS holds LGBTQ status is protected within Title VII’s meaning of “sex”

The Supreme Court held that LGBTQ status is already protected within Title VII’s meaning of the word “sex.”

Today, we must decide whether an employer can fire someone simply for being homosexual or transgender. The answer is clear. An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.

In authoring the majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch observed that the word “sex” would likely not have been read that way by the drafters of Title VII in 1964, but the majority held that the term is unambiguous as drafted; according to well-established precedent, resort to legislative history is not permitted when a statutory text is unambiguous.

Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular result. Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s consequences that have become apparent over the years, including its prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban on the sexual harassment of male employees. But the limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s demands. When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.

The majority confirmed that, while Title VII’s “sex” protections directly protect such traits/classes, plaintiffs may also assert sex-stereotyping claims related to such traits/classes, just as plaintiffs can assert sex-stereotyping claims based on male-female cys-gendered status.

To be sure, there may be cases in which a gay, lesbian, or transgender individual can make a claim like the one in Price Waterhouse. That is, there may be cases where traits or behaviors that some people associate with gays, lesbians, or transgender individuals are tolerated or valued in persons of one biological sex but not the other. But that is a different matter.

SCOTUS rules for baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop

By 7-2, the Supreme Court ruled for the baker in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case. All seven of the judges that formed the majority were struck by comments from the Colorado Civil Rights Commissioners that evidenced an anti-religious bias among the Commissioners when they decided the case. The Supreme Court called those comments “inappropriate,” “dismissive,” and “disparag(ing) of religion.”

What were these unacceptable comments? Well, in short, they included what can only be described as a gratuitous rant by one Commissioner about how, in her opinion, “religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust … we can list hundreds of situations.” It really didn’t help when the Commission, faced with three different cases involving bakers who refused to sell anti-gay marriage cakes, held for each of those bakers. The Supreme Court held that, pulling that all together, it seemed the Commission had made its decision not on the evidence and law but “the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.”

Along those lines, Justice Gorsuch, in his concurrence, noted that, if the government could make decisions on the basis of what it deems offensive, freedome of speech and expression would be lost. This is the oft-recognized principle that the only speech that really needs Constitutional protection is offensive speech.

The Constitution protects not just popular religious exercises from the condemnation of civil authorities. It protects them all.

In reversing based on the Commission’s own bias, the Supreme Court never reached the underlying question whether/when does a baker/florist/other expressive craftsman have a First Amendment right to refuse to sell their good/service to a consumer for religious reasons. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the baker had at least been entitled to a fair hearing of that issue, and that the Commission’s own bias had stripped him of that right.

(T)he delicate question of when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance the State sought to reach. That requirement, however, was not met here. When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not do so with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.

Justice Kennedy — who has been the Court’s champion of both gay rights and speech rights, as well as religious liberty rights — wrote the majority opinion. He acknowledged that the Court was dodging the real question of how to balance those rights.

The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts….

Still, his opinion suggested how he thought the Court should rule in future cases.

Some examples of cases where he suggested future bakers/florists/etc. might lose on the merits included the following:

  • A baker who “refused to sell any goods or any cakes for gay weddings”

Some examples of future cases where bakers/etc. might win included the following:

  • A “refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the cake”
  • A “refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right way”
  • A “refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it”

We may not have to wait long to find out how the Supreme Court will rule on the underlying issues. A similar case — involving a florist from Washington — is already pending a decision by the Supreme Court whether to hear the appeal in the fall.

Separate opinions in Masterpiece Cakeshop seemed to preview how the Justices might vote:

  • Justice Gorsuch wrote suggesting that he is likely to rule broadly for future bakers/florists/etc.
  • Justice Thomas wrote along such lines as well, though his opinion suggested concern over the concept of even trying to protect the rights of a gay couple in this type of circumstance.
  • Justices Kagan and Breyer, who joined the majority in this case, suggested they would lean split on future cases, ruling against bakers/etc., where there is no evidence of anti-religiouis bias among the state agencies.
  • Justice Ginsburg joined by Justice Sotomayor wrote to express their concerns that the anti-religious comments by the Commission, while unacceptable, were simply not so substantial as to warrant reversal; they would have ruled on the merits, and in doing so, for the gay couple who wished to buy the cake.

That means future cases are likely to have 4 Justices inclined to rule for and 4 Justices inclined to rule against the bakers/florists/etc., and as was expected here, Justice Kennedy is likely to be the swing vote. Expect to see him flesh out his balancing test based on those examples.

As for future cases, Justice Kennedy gave one word of warning — frankly simply restating the concern most of America seemingly has had and had hoped the Supreme Court would wrestle with in this decision — that these rights must be balanced such that religious liberty is not so broadly defined that it becomes an easy excuse for discrimination:

And any decision in favor of (a future) baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons.

Readers of course will note that this concern exists not only as to LGBTQ individuals (which is all that quote discusses) but also individuals on the basis of race, gender, age, etc., and, yes, even religion. It simply cannot be the law that a business may refuse to do business on the grounds that a consumer is of a different race, color, gender or even religion.

Readers should also note that this line of cases isn’t just about consumers, and it certainly isn’t about just cakes. This line of cases has potential to touch all aspects of American life. It cannot be, for example, that a business has a right to refuse to hire someone simply because they assert a religious belief against that person’s sexual orientation, gender preference, race, gender, religion, etc.

Source: Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. C.C.R.C., case no. 16-11 (Sup.Ct. 6/4/18).

Sixth Circuit holds transgendered workers are already protected by Title VII

Following a recent Second Circuit decision holding that sexual preference (LGB) is already protected by Title VII within the meaning of “sex,” the Sixth Circuit has held that being transgendered is also so protected.

While both cases may be heading for Supreme Court review, they suggest that LGBT may well be determined by other federal Circuit Courts to have been protected by Title VII since its inception in 1964. Employers are reminded that many states and local governments already have express protections for LGBT workers.

Source: EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., case no. 16-2424 (6th Cir. 3/7/18).

Second Circuit holds Title VII has always protected sexual orientation within its protection of “sex”

Following a recent series of cases discussed earlier on this blog, the Second Circuit has held that sexual orientation is, and has always been, included within the meaning of Title VII’s protection of “sex.”

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as discrimination “because of . . . sex.” To the extent that our prior precedents held otherwise, they are overruled.

Source: Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., case no. 15-3775 (2nd Cir. 2/26/18).

Google memo litigation continues, on two fronts

As previously reported on this blog, the NLRB recently cleared Google of charges that it had allegedly violated Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act by discharging the author of a controversial memo that attempted to explain his view that men are biologically more fit to be engineers than women. The NLRB held that, while some aspects of his memo might have been protected under Section 7 — a part of the NLRA that applies to both unionized and non-unionized workplaces — there were parts that stereotyped women and warranted Google’s decision to “nip in the bud” (quoting the NLRB General Counsel) his sexist communication.

The NLRB General Counsel’s decision, though, doesn’t end the litigation. There are now at least two separate lawsuits on-going: One by the memo’s author, James Damore, and another by a critic of Damore’s views, Tim Chevalier.

Both are former employees, terminated by Google for their speech involving Damore’s memo. In his memo, Damore advocated that Google had a culture of discrimination against white men and conservatatives, despite his view that men were in fact biologically better fit to be engineers at the highest level of the tech industry. In contrast Chevalier advocated verbally, through conduct, by email, on social media and on Google’s internal systems, that the Damore memo was “misogynistic,” that it was hostile to protected classes including gender, sex and race, and that it reflected, he alleged, a larger culture of hostility, including bullying, at Google on those same bases.

Damore’s lawsuit includes allegations, under California’s anti-discrimination laws, that Google discriminates against conservatives, Caucasians and men. Damore seeks to represent a class of such individuals against Google.

Chevalier’s lawsuit, also filed under California state law, asserts that he too was terminated for his political speech, including his activities to oppose not only Damore’s memo but also the Trump Administration’s politics and to protect the rights of minorities and women and rights associated with gender preference and sexual orientation. Also, Chevalier, a transgendered man, alleges his termination was linked to his efforts to protect related to sexual orientation and gender preference.

Both complaints are lengthy and warrant additional review by interested readers. Those are just some of their allegations. The merits of Mr. Damore and Mr. Chevalier’s complaints will be litigated, but the filing of their lawsuits illustrates how labor laws like the NLRA interact with employment laws like those at-issue in these lawsuits. An employer can comply with one set of laws and run afoul of another.

Sources: Duvalier complaint; Chevalier complaint.

Turn on your radios!

The Supreme Court holds oral arguments tomorrow in Masterpiece Cakeshop. I will be live in-studio on 850 KOA Colorado’s Morning News, for a series of segments starting about 8:00 AM tomorrow morning discussing the case.

SCOTUS grants review in Masterpiece Cakeshop case

In a case that pits religious freedoms against anti-discrimination laws, the Supreme Court agreed today to hear the appeal of a Colorado case against a baker that refused to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple.  Hear me (Bill Berger) discussing this development on 850 KOA moments after the order.

Source: 062617zor_8759.pdf

Seventh Circuit expands Title VII to cover sexual orientation

As predicted in earlier postings, the issue of whether sexual orientation is protected by Title VII is likely to see further examination by future courts. Now, the Seventh Circuit has split from those prior courts and held that, at least in its jurisdiction (Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin), sexual orientation is protected by Title VII.

The split in Circuit Courts suggests a likelihood that this issue will now rise to the Supreme Court.

Colorado law already protects sexual orientation, as does the law in many states.

The case was Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, — F.3d — (7th Cir. 4/4/17).

Eleventh Circuit splits over sexual orientation

In a split decision, following a recent decision by the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that sexual orientation is not protected by Title VII.

Colorado law already protects sexual orientation, as does the law in many states.

The case was Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, — F.3d — (11th Cir. 3/10/17).

Second Circuit signals potential major expansion of Title VII’s protections for sexual orientation

Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of … sex,” and many court decisions have held that “sex” does not include sexual orientation. Thus, homosexuality is not protected by Title VII.

In this case, a panel of the Second Circuit repeated that holding; however, the panel then noted that, if it could consider the issue fresh, as could the Second Circuit en banc  (sitting as a full bench), it believed several arguments, outlined in its decision, would warrant holding that sexual orientation should be protected by Title VII.

The decision signals a potential expansion for protection of sexual orientation at the federal level. Colorado law already protects sexual orientation, as does the law in many states.

The case was Christiansen v. Omnicon Group, Inc., — F.3d — (2nd Cir. 3/27/17).