Colorado unemployment agency continues trend of ruling in favor of workers who decline to return to work

A previous post addressed the requirement that workers return to work — or face loss of unemployment — when an offer to return (to comparable work) is extended, unless the worker is a “vulnerable individual” or otherwise unable to return due to coronavirus-related reasons. As noted there, the initial report was that the state was tending to find in favor of employees by a large margin. The Denver Business Journal is reporting today that the state unemployment agency is continuing that trend, now finding 84% of the time in favor of workers.

Colorado Department of Labor and Employment officials have received about 1,100 submissions from employers about workers who have refused to come back to work in recent weeks and want to keep receiving jobless benefits. And of the 869 cases that CDLE officials have adjudicated, only 16% have ended in workers being told to return to their positions or give up their unemployment payments, chief communications officer Cher Haavind said.

In the vast majority of cases, workers claiming they can’t safely return to work fall into one of two categories delineated by federal and state law as allowing them to refuse to go back to an environment where they would interact with many co-workers or customers, Haavind said. One is that they are part of a vulnerable population that would make them more susceptible to catching coronavirus — people over age 65 or who have underlying medical conditions such as heart troubles or being immunocompromised. The second is that they are caring either for someone who is at increased risk of contracting the virus or are caring for a child out of school.

Supreme Court reaffirms importance of “but-for” analysis in certain kinds of discrimination claims against private employers

An on-going issue in litigation is frequently the standard of causation and whether a plaintiff’s allegations and evidence are established to meet it. One of the more strict standards is the “but-for” test, meaning a plaintiff must show that the adverse employment action (such as termination or refusal to hire) would not have occurred “but for” their membership in a protected class. One of the least strict standards requires the plaintiff to prove only that their membership in a protected class was “a motivating factor” in the decision.

Two recent Supreme Court decisions reinforced the role of “but-for” analysis in at least certain kinds of cases.

First in  Babb v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court held that governmental employers do not enjoy the protection of “but for” analysis in age discrimination claims, even though private employers have and continue to be able to assert the need for “but for” proof in age discrimination cases.

We are not persuaded by the argument that it is anomalous to hold the Federal Government to a stricter standard than private employers or state and local governments. That is what the statutory language dictates, and if Congress had wanted to impose the same standard on all employers, it could have easily done so. 

Second in Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Mediaa unanimous Supreme Court held that a plaintiff asserting a sec. 1981 claim against a non-governmental defendant must meet the stricter “but-for” test, rather than the less strict “motivating factor” test.

Readers are reminded that the “motivating factor” test is the applicable test in some types of claims. As the Supreme Court explained in Comcast, the issue depends upon the specific statute, its language and its legislative history, as well as the extent of relief sought on the claim asserted.

DOL expands availability of overtime exemption for commissioned-employees working for a “retail or service establishment”

The nation’s leading wage-hour law (FLSA, the Fair Labor Standards Act) has long recognized an exemption from overtime for employees who work on a commission. However, the exemption is only available if the employee is working for a “retail or service establishment.”

To be a “retail or service establishment” the company “(a) (m)ust engage in the making of sales of goods or services; and (b) 75 percent of its sales of goods or services, or of both, must be recognized as retail in the particular industry; and (c) not over 25 percent of its sales of goods or services, or of both, may be sales for resale. ” 29 CFR 779.313. The DOL says that this means the business must have a “retail concept.” 29 CFR 779.316.

Typically a retail or service establishment is one which sells goods or services to the general public. It serves the everyday needs of the community in which it is located. The retail or service establishment performs a function in the business organization of the Nation which is at the very end of the stream of distribution, disposing in small quantities of the products and skills of such organization and does not take part in the manufacturing process. (See, however, the discussion of section 13(a)(4) in §§ 779.346 to 779.350.) Such an establishment sells to the general public its food and drink. It sells to such public its clothing and its furniture, its automobiles, its radios and refrigerators, its coal and its lumber, and other goods, and performs incidental services on such goods when necessary. It provides the general public its repair services and other services for the comfort and convenience of such public in the course of its daily living. Illustrative of such establishments are: Grocery stores, hardware stores, clothing stores, coal dealers, furniture stores, restaurants, hotels, watch repair establishments, barber shops, and other such local establishments.

Quoting: 29 CFR 779.318

In addition to the definition of a “retail or service establishment,” the DOL had published a list of business that “may be recognized as retail” and another list that “may not be.” 29 CFR 779.317 and .320. The lists have been roundly criticized over the years. They were not internally consistent, they did not reflect changing realities of the business world, and they were formulated without first going through the formal regulatory process.

The DOL has withdrawn its lists. While the definition of “retail or service establishment” itself has not been affected, the withdrawal of the arbitrary unrealistic add-on lists is intended to make the commission exemption available to more businesses.

Employers who think they fit within the definition of “retail or service establishment” may now wish to consult with legal counsel about using the commissioned-employee overtime exemption, even if they previously were not on the “may be” list or even were previously on the “may not be” list.

Employers are reminded to confirm compliance with state and local law. For example in Colorado COMPS Order 36 has its own commissioned-employee exemption requirements (rule 2.4.2).

Source: DOL final rule, “Partial Lists of Establishments that Lack or May Have a ‘Retail Concept’ Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,” 85 Fed. Reg. 97 (May 19, 2020).

Considering a voluntary internal audit to prepare for Colorado’s new equal pay law?

Last year I co-authored an article for the Colorado Lawyer about Colorado’s new equal pay law (the Colorado Equal Pay for Equal Work Act, “CEPEWA”), with two of CEPEWA’s drafters, Sarah Parady and Charlotte Sweeney. CEPEWA will take effect January 1, 2021. In our article, we noted that CEPEWA “CEPEWA does not grandfather current pay disparities” and further that “proof of intent to discriminate is not an element of a CEPEWA violation.” We recommended employers consider performing a voluntary internal audit to identify and eliminate any inadvertent pay disparities. Indeed CEPEWA recognizes a possible reduction of exposure if internal audits are done.

A new article was just published in the Colorado Lawyer discussing what such an audit might look like.

Source: Mind the Gap: Practical Solutions to Minimize Pay Equity Claims, by Christine Lyman, Lonnie Giamela, and LaLonnie Gray, The Colorado Lawyer, vol. 49 no. 5 (May 2020)

NLRB amends and republishes its final rule “to protect employee free choice”

As previously posted on this blog, the NLRB issued a final rule “to protect employee free choice” altering its approach to blocking charges, voluntary recognition and construction industry (section 9(a)) voluntary recognition. The Board has amended and republished its final rule. The Board explained its final rule, including the amendments, as follows:

  • Blocking Charge Policy: The amendment replaces the current blocking charge policy with either a vote-and-count or a vote-and-impound procedure. Elections would no longer be blocked by pending unfair labor practice charges, but the ballots would be either counted or impounded—depending on the nature of the charges—until the charges are resolved. Regardless of the nature of the charge, the certification of results (including, where appropriate, a certification of representative) shall not issue until there is a final disposition of the charge and its effect, if any, on the election petition.
  • Voluntary Recognition Bar: The amendment returns to the rule of Dana Corp., 351 NLRB 434 (2007). For voluntary recognition under Section 9(a) of the Act to bar a subsequent representation petition—and for a post-recognition collective-bargaining agreement to have contract-bar effect—unit employees must receive notice that voluntary recognition has been granted and are given a 45-day open period within which to file an election petition. The amendment applies to a voluntary recognition on or after the effective date of the rule.
  • Section 9(a) Recognition in the Construction Industry: The amendment states that in the construction industry, where bargaining relationships established under Section 8(f) cannot bar petitions for a Board election, proof of a Section 9(a) relationship will require positive evidence of majority employee support and cannot be based on contract language alone, overruling Staunton Fuel, 335 NLRB 717 (2001). The amendment applies to an employer’s voluntary recognition extended on or after the effective date of the rule, and to any collective-bargaining agreement entered into on or after the effective date of voluntary recognition extended on or after the effective date of the rule.

NLRB delays effective date for revised representation procedures

As previously posted on this blog, the NLRB has reversed course on its Obama-era expedited election procedures. Originally scheduled to take effect April 16, 2020, the NLRB announced its final rule will now take effect May 31, 2020.

EEOC updates Q&A, specifically re employees with an underlying disability that puts them at “higher risk” re coronavirus

The EEOC updated its prior Q&A re coronavirus, adding three questions (numbered G3-G5) to address the needs of employees who already suffer from an underlying disability that, now, puts them at “higher risk” related to coronavirus.

First in questions G3-G4, the EEOC advises that an employer is obligated to consider whether a reasonable accommodation exists to permit such an individual to return to work once a request is made. Until a request is made, the employer has no obligation to consider the possibility of a reasonable accommodation. The EEOC explains too that the request need not be made formally — it may be made “in conversation or in writing” — and it need not be made by the employee themselves — it may be made by the employee “or a third party, such as an employee’s doctor.” Indeed the request need not even be a request, it is enough if the employee “let(s) the employer know that she needs a change for a reason related to” an underlying disability.

Question G4 confirms that an employer need not consider a reasonable accommodation even when the company knows the worker has an underlying disability that might put them at a “higher risk” related to coronavirus, until such a request is made. However where the employer is itself concerned that the employee’s disability might put them at a “higher risk” related to coronavirus, the employer cannot on its own initiative “exclude” the worker from work unless it can prove a “direct threat” to the worker’s own health (or the health of others) and, further, that the “direct threat” cannot be removed by reasonable accommodation, such as allowing “telework, leave, or reassignment” if reasonable. The EEOC discusses the possibility of showing such a “direct threat,” noting it “is a high standard,” with proof that “if, after going through all these steps (of considering the relevant risk, the possibility of reasonable accommodation, etc.), the facts support the conclusion that the employee poses a significant risk of substantial harm to himself that cannot be reduced or eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”

Question G5 discusses possible accommodations that should be considered by an employer and worker in trying to determine if a reasonable accommodation might exist to permit a worker with an underlying disability to work despite a “higher risk” related to coronavirus (emphasis added).

Accommodations may include additional or enhanced protective gowns, masks, gloves, or other gear beyond what the employer may generally provide to employees returning to its workplace.  Accommodations also may include additional or enhanced protective measures, for example, erecting a barrier that provides separation between an employee with a disability and coworkers/the public or increasing the space between an employee with a disability and others.  Another possible reasonable accommodation may be elimination or substitution of particular “marginal” functions (less critical or incidental job duties as distinguished from the “essential” functions of a particular position).  In addition, accommodations may include temporary modification of work schedules (if that decreases contact with coworkers and/or the public when on duty or commuting) or moving the location of where one performs work (for example, moving a person to the end of a production line rather than in the middle of it if that provides more social distancing).

These are only a few ideas.  Identifying an effective accommodation depends, among other things, on an employee’s job duties and the design of the workspace.  An employer and employee should discuss possible ideas; the Job Accommodation Network (www.askjan.org) also may be able to assist in helping identify possible accommodations.  As with all discussions of reasonable accommodation during this pandemic, employers and employees are encouraged to be creative and flexible.

Colorado unemployment disputes skyrocket as employers begin to offer returns to work that employees decline, with CDLE at least initially tending to rule for workers

As previously posted on this blog, the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment Unemployment created a new portal for employers to use to report when an employee refuses after being offered to return to work; the refusal will generally render the individual ineligible for further unemployment, unless the individual can prove they are “vulnerable” and that the company has inadequate coronavirus protections in place.

The Denver Business Journal is reporting that approximately 150 workers have already advised the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment that they do not wish to return to work and would rather stay on unemployment due to concerns about coronavirus, while 200 employers have used the new portal to report refusals.

How is the CDLE handling these disputes? The Denver Business Journal advises the agency is attempting to investigate each claim individually, without agency representatives actually going to jobsites though.

Instead, workers will be asked to explain what underlying condition they have that makes it unsafe for them to return to work or why they feel the workplace is an unsafe environment, and employers will be asked if the worker is coming back at the same job and pay rate and if efforts have been made at increased sanitation and social distancing.

Who’s winning these disputes? For now the Denver Business Journal reports the CDLE is ruling generally in favor of the workers.

So far, CDLE officials, who have gone through about 55 claims, are coming down on the sides of the workers at a ratio of about 10-to-1, said Jeff Fitzgerald, unemployment insurance division director.

The CDLE does not explain in the article how it plans to address this issue going-forward especially if, as reported in the Denver Post, the combination of traditional unemployment benefits plus pandemic unemployment benefits is high enough that a “majority” of workers in Colorado are actually earning more money on unemployment currently than they would in their job if returned.

The cutoff point is around $30 an hour in Colorado, according to the study by Gregory Miller, a CFA and graduate researcher at CSU. Make more than that and the financial incentive is to return to work. Make less than that, and collecting unemployment pays better, especially if a job doesn’t come with health insurance and other benefits.

The combination of that “financial incentive” plus health concerns about the possible coronavirus-related implications of returning to work around others, even subject to Colorado’s social distancing guidelines, means the CDLE is going to be required to address many, many more such disputes going-forward.

Looking for a short primer on which expenses are forgivable and how to maximize the forgiveness of a PPP loan?

Here’s a handy short primer on PPP loans, discussing which expenses are forgivable and steps employers can take to maximize the forgiveness of a PPP loan.

Which Paycheck Protection Program Expenses Are Eligible for Forgiveness?
— Read on www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/Pages/Paycheck-Protection-Program-Expense-Forgiveness.aspx

Trying to prepare your EEO-1 data filing in the midst of coronavirus pandemic? FYI, the EEOC just delayed EEO-1 data collection for 2020 due to coronavirus

The EEOC has delayed EEO-1 data collection for 2020 until 2021 due to coronavirus. In its press release, the EEOC explained the delay, as follows:

The EEOC recognizes the impact that the current public health emergency is having on workplaces across America and the challenges that both employers and employees alike are now facing. Filers of the EEO-1, EEO-3and EEO-5, which include private sector employers, local referral unions, and public elementary and secondary school districts, are dealing with unique and urgent issues. Delaying the collections until 2021 will ensure that EEO filers are better positioned to provide accurate, valid and reliable data in a timely manner.

EEO-1, EEO-3 and EEO-5 filers should begin preparing to submit data in 2021. Pending approval from the Office of Management and Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) the EEOC would expect to begin collecting the 2019 and 2020 EEO-1 Component 1 in March 2021 and will notify filers of the precise date the surveys will open as soon as it is available. The EEOC would expect to begin collecting the 2020 EEO-3 and the 2020 EEO-5 in January 2021 and will notify filers of the precise date the surveys will open as soon as it is available.

In addition to updates to the agency website, the EEOC will be reaching out directly to EEO-1, 3, and 5 filers regarding the delayed opening of the surveys.

The EEOC will formally publish its announcement in the Federal Register, to appear, starting 5/8/2020, here.

DOL issues new model COBRA notices to address growing wave of litigation

The DOL has issued a new set of model COBRA notices that may be used to comply with COBRA’s requirements, along with a set of explanatory Q&A’s. The DOL’s model COBRA forms are not required to be used, they are intended to reduce litigation exposure by helping to “to ensure that qualified beneficiaries better understand the interactions between Medicare and COBRA.”

Employers should immediately contact their health insurance and benefits providers and plan administrators to ensure they are using the correct COBRA documentation.

California sues Uber and Lyft alleging driver misclassification

In furtherance of California’s AB 5, the State of California has sued Uber and Lyft, seeking to re-characterize their drivers as employees, not independent contractors. The State summarized its case in the introductory paragraphs of its Complaint, as follows:

5. Uber and Lyft are transportation companies in the business of selling rides to customers, and their drivers are the employees who provide the rides they sell.  The fact that Uber and Lyft communicate with their drivers by using an app does not suddenly strip drivers of their fundamental rights as employees.

6. But rather than own up to their legal responsibilities, Uber and Lyft have worked relentlessly to find a work-around.  They lobbied for an exemption to A.B. 5, but the Legislature declined.  They utilize driver contracts with mandatory arbitration and class action waiver provisions to stymie private enforcement of drivers’ rights.  And now, even amid a once-in-a century pandemic, they have gone to extraordinary lengths to convince the public that their unlawful misclassification scheme is in the public interest.  Both companies have launched an aggressive public relations campaign in the hopes of enshrining their ability to mistreat their workers, all while peddling the lie that driver flexibility and worker protections are somehow legally incompatible.

7. Uber’s and Lyft’s motivation for breaking the law is simple: by misclassifying their drivers, Uber and Lyft do not “bear any of [the] costs or responsibilities” of complying with the law.  (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 913.)  When addressing investors, Uber pulls no punches:  “Our business would be adversely affected if Drivers were classified as employees instead of independent contractors.”  (Uber Securities and Exchange Com. (“SEC”) S-1, p. 28 [Filing Date: April 11, 2019].)

8. As one federal district judge recently observed: “[R]ather than comply with a clear legal obligation, companies like Lyft are thumbing their noses at the California Legislature . . . .”  (Rogers v. Lyft (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020, No. 20-CV-01938-VC) ___ F.Supp.3d ___ [2020 WL 16484151, at *2].) 9. The State’s laws against employee misclassification protect all Californians.  They protect workers by ensuring they receive the compensation and benefits they have earned through the dignity of their labor.  (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 952.)   They protect “law-abiding” businesses from “unfair competition,” and prevent the “race to the bottom” that occurs when businesses adopt “substandard wages” and “unhealthy [working] conditions,” threatening jobs and worker protections across entire industries.  (Id. at pp. 952, 960.)  They protect the tax-paying public, who is often called upon to “assume responsibility” for “the ill effects to workers and their families” of exploitative working arrangements.  (Id. at p. 952-53.)  They are a lifeline and bulwark for the People against the “erosion of the middle class and the rise in income inequality.”  (A.B. 5, § 1(c).) 10. The time has come for Uber’s and Lyft’s massive, unlawful employee misclassification schemes to end.  The People bring this action to ensure that Uber and Lyft ridehailing drivers—the lifeblood of these companies—receive the full compensation, protections, and benefits they are guaranteed under law, to restore a level playing field for competing businesses, and to preserve jobs and hard-won worker protections for all Californians.

The Complaint seeks to have Uber and Lyft’s drivers re-classified as employees, not independent contractors, the imposition of statutory penalties, and an open-ended to-be-proved basket of remedies involving “minimum wages, overtime wages, business expenses, meal and rest periods, wage statements, paid sick leave and health benefits, and social insurance programs.”

Although the drivers at-issue may have entered into arbitration agreements, it is anticipated the State’s lawsuit will not be subject to arbitration because, in this case, it is the State that has filed suit, and the State was not party to the driver arbitration agreements.