Three issues in Colorado regarding vacation pay

Colorado law, CRS 8-4-101 defines vacation to be a part of “wages” when “earned in accordance with the terms of any agreement. If an employer provides paid vacation for an employee, the employer shall pay upon separation from employment all vacation pay earned and determinable in accordance with the terms of any agreement between the employer and the employee.” As such, an employee cannot agree to waive vacation, or any other “wages,” once “earned, pursuant to CRS 8-4-121, and CRS 8-4-109 requires that such vacation, along with all other “wages,” to be paid out in final paychecks.

Despite what seems relatively clear statutory language on first blush, three issues persist. Colorado employers have received some fleshout on at least two.

1. Can an employer impose conditions on the payout of vacation in a final paycheck? The Colorado Court of Appeals says, yes.

A recent Colorado Court of Appeals case suggests the law may not be that simple. In  Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc.,  the employer added a twist in its handbook. There, a policy said that an employee “forfeits all earned vacation and pay benefits” if they fail to provide 2-week notice before quitting. The employee cited the foregoing statutes, arguing the vacation could not be waived and had to be paid out in the final paycheck.

The Court of Appeals held for the company. The Court of Appeals looked to the “terms of any agreement,” as required by the statute, in other words, to the language of the vacation policy and held that 2-week notice was a condition of earning the vacation.

Ms. Nieto’s right to compensation for accrued but unused vacation pay depends on the parties’ employment agreement. And that agreement unequivocally says that the vacation pay she seeks wasn’t vested given the circumstances under which she left the Market’s employ.

Is Nieto good law in Colorado, can employers rely comfortably on it? Many would argue that the Colorado Court of Appeals simply got it wrong. However, the deadline for appeal has now passed, so it is certainly the law as between Ms. Nieto and her former employer Clark’s Market, Inc. It is noted too that the decision was selected for official publication, so, unless the Court of Appeals or the Colorado Supreme Court revisit the issue in a future case, it is binding on trial courts. Therefore employers could arguably rely on it for now, so long as they are willing to risk protracted litigation and future appeals.

2. Can an employer apply a use-it-or-lose-it rule to vacation at the end of every year? The Colorado Division of Labor and Employment says, no, but the issue is pending in the Colorado Court of Appeals.

Pending before the Colorado Court of Appeals is Blount, Inc. v. CDLE, in which the Colorado Division of Labor and Employment is asking the Court of Appeals to rule against an employer’s purported use-it-or-lose-it policy. In an apparent effort to end-run the Court’s decision, the CDLE issued on the same day as it filed a brief in the appeal, a new rule (7 CCR 1103-7 rule 2.15) — which it then proceed to rely upon in its brief — stating that employers may not have use-it-or-lose-it policies. How will the Court of Appeals rule? How will the Court of Appeals view the CDLE’s apparent claim-jumping regulation? Will the Court of Appeals take Blount as an opportunity to re-consider or limit Nieto? Stay tuned.

3. Do these same rules apply to PTO or just vacation? The Division of Labor and Employment says, no, these restrictions do not apply to PTO.

As of this summer, callers to the Colorado Division of Labor and Employment will be told it takes the position that these “vacation” rules do not apply to PTO. CRS 8-4-101 speaks only to the inclusion of “vacation” in “wages,” not PTO; therefore, the Division will not currently pursue an administrative wage claim for PTO.

Notwithstanding, employers should realize that some plaintiff attorneys will take such claims to court, but they do so under a contract law theory, not under Colorado’s wage statutes, and as a contract claim, such claims do not carry attorney fees or penalties.

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Supreme Court rules arbitrator should, depending on language, decide arbitrability, but Colorado law might say otherwise?

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court held, in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., held that, depending on the language of the parties’ arbitration agreement, it is for an arbitrator, not a judge in court, to decide questions of arbitrability. The decision involved relatively common language saying, “Any dispute arising under o related to this Agreement (except for actions seeking injunctive relief and disputes related to trademarks, trade secrets, or other intellectual property…) shall be resolved by binding arbitration….” That language is sufficient, the Court held, to invest in the arbitrator, not the judge, the arbitrability of a complaint that sought in part injunctive relief (arguably falling into that language’s exception). The Supreme Court’s decision significantly shifted into arbitration an even larger chunk, as it were, of the kinds of issues that are frequently litigated in these cases. The Supreme Court relied on the Federal Arbitration Act’s broad policy of favoring arbitration.

A recent article in the Colorado Lawyer notes that CRS 13-22-206 of Colorado’s state arbitration act might suggest otherwise, at least as to cases seeking arbitration under state law versus the FAA, which the article notes might be a question. Section 13-22-206 of Colorado’s state law provides, in part, as follows:

(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.

(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.

(4) If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the existence of, or claims that a controversy is not subject to, an agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration proceeding may continue pending final resolution of the issue by the court, unless the court otherwise orders.

 

Gene Commander, Esq., author of the article, concludes with the helpful suggestion that drafters consider FAA preemption and further draft the agreement to clearly memorialize the parties’ intent as to whether and which arbitrability issues will be decided by a judge versus a court.

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Honored to be named to Best Lawyers in America

Honored to be named to Best Lawyers in America again this year, thank you!

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Colorado criminalizes wage theft

Effective January 1, 2020, Colorado has criminalized wage thefts. This new law applies to “employers,” a term defined to be commensurate with the Fair Labor Standards Act’s coverage, and protects “employees,” as defined to exclude independent contractors.

Under this new law it will be a crime to:

  • willfully
  • refuse to pay or “falsely” deny “the amount of a wage claim, or the validity thereof, or that the same is due”
  • “with intent to secure for himself, herself, or another person any discount upon such indebtedness or any underpayment of such indebtedness”
    • “or with intent to annoy, harass, opress, hinder, coerce, delay, or defraud” the employee.”

Who may be charged with this crime? “Every employer or other person who intentionally, individually or as an officer, agent, or employee of a corporation or other person” who “pays or causes to be paid to any such employee a wage less than” that required.

This new crime will rise to the level of a felony if the amount at-issue equals or exceeds $2,000.

Employers, including all individuals involved in the payroll function and related decisions whether or not to pay wages, should anticipate that employees will seek to have such matters prosecuted, in addition to or instead of civil wage claims. This new Colorado law is all the more reason for employers to carefully review their wage compliance efforts.

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