Federal law (FLSA) contains an exemption from overtime requirements for Highly Compensated Employees. In its Fact Sheet 17H, DOL summarizes the Highly Compensated Employee exemption, as follows:
The regulations contain a special rule for “highly compensated” employees who are paid total annual compensation of $107,432 or more. A highly compensated employee is deemed exempt under Section 13(a)(1) if:
The employee earns total annual compensation of $107,432 or more, which includes at least $684* per week paid on a salary or fee basis;
The employee’s primary duty includes performing office or non-manual work; and
The employee customarily and regularly performs at least one of the exempt duties or responsibilities of an exempt executive, administrative or professional employee.
Thus, for example, an employee may qualify as an exempt highly compensated executive if the employee customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees, even though the employee does not meet all of the other requirements in the standard test for exemption as an executive.
In Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt, the Supreme Court wrestled with the first requirement: The payment of at least $684 per week, $107,432 on a salary or fee basis. The case involved a worker who was paid well in excess of that amount. He earned “over $200,000 annually.” But, he argued, he wasn’t paid that amount “on a salary or fee basis.” Rather, he was paid a daily rate for each day he worked every two weeks. He worked on an offshore oil rig and was typically active 84 hours per week. There was no argument that he was paid on a “fee basis,” instead his employer argued that he was paid the requisite amount because he was in fact paid so much more than the required minimum.
In fact the dissent noted that, although he hadn’t been guaranteed a minimum weekly amount, he was guaranteed a minimum daily amount because he was paid by a daily rate, and the dissent noted that his daily rate was $963, thus the dissent noted that if he worked any part of a week, he was guaranteed to receive at least $963, well in excess of the minimum $684 per week required by FLSA.
The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed. The Supreme Court held that the actual amounts paid were not the only issue. While this worker’s actual pay exceeded — by far — FLSA’s minimum threshold, it hadn’t been paid by way of a guaranteed minimum weekly salary. In short, he was paid by way of a daily rate, which, the majority held, is not the same a minimum guaranteed weekly salary.
Employers who hope to rely on an exemption under FLSA that requires payment of a minimum guaranteed weekly salary are cautioned that the Supreme Court’s decision may not be limited to the Highly Compensated Employee exemption. Employers hoping to rely on any exemption under FLSA should take care to consult with legal counsel about their compensation structures. Helix Energy is a cautious reminder that the amount paid alone is not sufficient to exempt a worker; the remainder of each exemption’s requirements must be met, including, where applicable, the minimum guaranteed weekly salary requirement.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2023-02-23 15:54:272023-02-23 15:54:27Supreme Court holds that Highly Compensated Employee exemption requires guaranteed salary irrespective of actual amount paid
In EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., the Seventh Circuit held that an employer need not offer light duty to pregnant workers, even though it offers the same to employees who are on workers compensation, so long as the company does not also offer light duty to those who are ill or injured off-the-job. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. UPS, that held, without further explanation, that pregnant workers must be offered light duty if it is offered to other employees with similar restrictions. The Seventh Circuit distinguished a 2016 Second Circuit case, Legg v. Ulster County, that had required light duty for pregnant workers even though it was otherwise reserved for workers comp cases, because, there, the Seventh Circuit held the employer had offered “confused and inconsistent rationales” for its decision to reserve light duty for workers comp cases. The Seventh Circuit didn’t explain why that employer’s rationales were “confused and inconsistent,” whereas, this employer’s were clear and persuasive, except to note that this employer explained that reserving light duty for workers compensation cases helped it to reduce “costs” and “legal exposure,” given the state of Wisconsin’s statutory schemes governing workers compensation claims and the incentives provided therein for light duty.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2022-08-16 15:44:012022-08-16 15:49:35Seventh Circuit Affirms Employer’s Right To Provide Workers Comp Light Duty But Refuse To Provide Light Duty To Pregnant Workers
In a 6-3 opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade. The implications for employers, even private employers, will likely be widespread but are as-yet unclear.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2022-06-27 09:19:562022-06-27 09:19:56Supreme Court reverses Roe v. Wade, implications for employers will be widespread but are as-yet unclear
A 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court held in Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. that a public school coach’s midfield post-game prayer, with students, is protected by the First Amendment.
Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free and diverse Republic—whether those expressions take place in a sanctuary or on a field, and whether they manifest through the spoken word or a bowed head. Here, a government entity sought to punish an individual for engaging in a brief, quiet, personal religious observance doubly protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. And the only meaningful justification the government offered for its reprisal rested on a mistaken view that it had a duty to ferret out and suppress religious observances even as it allows comparable secular speech.
The dissent noted that the prayer was anything but post-game, as it occurred during the entire overall game-night event, which the coach began with a locker-room prayer, and while student-athletes weren’t ordered to participate they were, the evidence established, effectively coerced, allowing the coach to evangelize his public school government employee job. Indeed, the dissent pointed out, evidence showed that others viewed the coach’s behavior as a sign that the public school itself was endorsing his prayers, itself a violation of the First Amendment’s church-state separations.
Readers are reminded that the First Amendment does not apply as against private employers.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2022-06-27 09:16:142022-06-27 09:16:14Supreme Court holds public school coach’s midfield post-game prayer, with students, is protected by First Amendment
The FAA (Federal Arbitration Act) permits a party to an arbitration agreement to demand, when sued in court, that the lawsuit be submitted to arbitration instead, but what if that party waives its right to demand arbitration by litigating the case in court for a while before deciding to demand arbitration? Must the other party show it was prejudiced by the delay? A unanimous Supreme Court held, no, the other party need only show that the party now demanding arbitration had knowingly relinquished its right to demand arbitration by acting inconsistently with that right. The case was Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. The Supreme Court left to the lower courts to decide how its new rule would apply in particular circumstances, holding only that prejudice is not required.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2022-05-23 15:41:502022-05-23 15:41:50Supreme Court holds that prejudice need not be shown if a party waives its right to demand arbitration
In Houston Community College System v. Wilson, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a public official, like all of us, enjoys free speech rights under the First Amendment; however, that speech cannot be weaponized in an effort to silence the free speech of others.
The First Amendment surely promises an elected representative like Mr. Wilson the right to speak freely on questions of government policy. But just as surely, it cannot be used as a weapon to silence other representatives seeking to do the same.
How broadly will the Supreme Court’s ruling be applied? The Court cautioned that its holding may be limited to its rather specific set of facts, which included that the public official at-issue had merely been censured.
Our case is a narrow one. It involves a censure of one member of an elected body by other members of the same body. It does not involve expulsion, exclusion, or any other form of punishment. It entails only a First Amendment retaliation claim, not any other claim or any other source of law. The Board’s censure spoke to the conduct of official business, and it was issued by individuals seeking to discharge their public duties. Even the censured member concedes the content of the censure would not have offended the First Amendment if it had been packaged differently. Neither the history placed before us nor this Court’s precedents support finding a viable First Amendment claim on these facts. Argument and “counterargument,” not litigation, are the “weapons available” for resolving this dispute.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2022-04-20 15:13:532022-04-06 15:21:59Supreme Court holds that at least some “weaponized” speech loses at least some First Amendment protections
A 3-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit has lifted the freeze on OSHA’s large company vaccine mandate (50 employees or more). The 3-judge panel decision was fully fractured, in that one judge wrote an opinion, in which a second concurred, making it technically the majority opinion; the third judge in the panel then wrote a scorching dissent that argued for the freeze’s immediate reinstatement. The dissent concluded with a call for individuals to act — by becoming vaccinated — not OSHA.
(OSHA) cannot even regulate for the sake of the vaccinated; they are not in “grave danger.” Instead, the mandate is aimed directly at protecting the unvaccinated from their own choices. Vaccines are freely available, and unvaccinated people may choose to protect themselves at any time. And because the Secretary likely lacks congressional authority to force them to protect themselves, the remaining stay factors cannot tip the balance.
The decision is now likely to face both a request for reconsideration by the entire bench of judges who constitute Sixth Circuit — of whom a majority are Republican appointees — and then a request for immediate review by the Supreme Court — where again it will face a majority of Republican appointees. Indeed challengers in the litigation have already filed motions with the Supreme Court requesting the immediate reinstatement of the freeze.
Recognizing that there isn’t now sufficient time for large companies to implement the mandate by the original deadlines and possibly even recognizing that its own rule is not likely to withstand the next two tiers of review, or is at least likely to face another freeze sooner than later, OSHA has announced it will delay enforcement of its own rules by approximately one month.
To account for any uncertainty created by the stay, OSHA is exercising enforcement discretion with respect to the compliance dates of the ETS. To provide employers with sufficient time to come into compliance, OSHA will not issue citations for noncompliance with any requirements of the ETS before January 10 and will not issue citations for noncompliance with the standard’s testing requirements before February 9, so long as an employer is exercising reasonable, good faith efforts to come into compliance with the standard. OSHA will work closely with the regulated community to provide compliance assistance.
Employers should certainly continue to consider how they can implement the mandate if required but remember that at least some states have already passed laws that make voluntary implementation challenging if not violations of those states’ laws. Given the nature of both the full bench of the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court justices, it is not at all unlikely this — unfortunately — now extremely political issue will trigger another freeze of OSHA’s rule in the coming weeks.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2021-12-18 13:33:432021-12-18 13:33:433-judge panel of Sixth Circuit lifts freeze on OSHA vaccine mandate for large companies
The Supreme Court struck down California’s expansive union access law, which had required commercial agricultural property owners to allow unions to come onto their land for up to 3 hours per day 120 days per year in furtherance of organizing campaigns. The statute went so far as to phrase this as a union’s “right to take access” to the private property. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held the California law was an unlawful taking of the property owner’s land rights, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. A concurrence by Justice Kavanaugh suggests the Court’s holding may not be limited to laws like California’s and may portend a new line of decisions that NLRB decisions requiring access to private property under the NLRA are similarly violations of the Fifth Amendment’s taking clause.
Source: Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, case no. 20-107, 2021 BL 234010 (6/23/2021).
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2021-06-24 17:28:402021-06-24 17:28:40Supreme Court strikes down California’s expansive union access law
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court upheld religious elementary schools’ ability to otherwise-discriminate against teachers under the “ministerial” exemption. Title VII, the ADEA and other anti-discrimination laws recognize a ministerial exemption, consistent with the First Amendment, that permits a synagogue, for example, to require that its rabbi actually be Jewish and that she adhere faithfully to the synagogue’s interpretation of Judaism.
In this case two teachers sued for wrongful discharge. One alleged age discrimination, the other alleged disability discrimination. The schools responded that it need not prove the real reason for their discharges because neither were protected under either the age or disability discrimination laws, because both fell under the ministerial exemption. Neither teacher was a “minister” in the sense of being ordained, having the title of a minister, or having any religious education or formal training. However, both taught courses that included religion. Both had been instructed when hired and again during their employment that their individual faith and morals were essential components of their jobs performance. Both prayed with their students as part of their jobs. The majority of the Court held all of that was sufficient for both to fall within the ministerial exemption.
There is abundant record evidence that they both performed vital religious duties. Educating and forming students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of the schools where they taught, and their employment agreements and faculty handbooks specified in no uncertain terms that they were expected to help the schools carry out this mission and that their work would be evaluated to ensure that they were fulfilling that responsibility. As elementary school teachers responsible for providing instruction in all subjects, including religion, they were the members of the school staff who were entrusted most directly with the responsibility of educating their students in the faith. And not only were they obligated to provide instruction about the Catholic faith, but they were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with the faith. They prayed with their students, attended Mass with the students, and prepared the children for their participation in other religious activities. …. Their titles did not include the term “minister,” and they had less formal religious training, but their core responsibilities as teachers of religion were essentially the same. And both their schools expressly saw them as playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the church, and the schools’ definition and explanation of their roles is important. In a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be expected to have a complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition. A religious institution’s explanation of the role of such employees in the life of the religion in question is important.
When passed, so-called “Obamacare” contained exemptions from its contraceptive-coverage requirements for religious organizations and other non-profits that hold sincerely held religious objections. Following a series of regulatory developments and judicial decisions, eventually, by 2018, the Trump Administration expanded the exemptions to include private employers, including even publicly traded companies, and secular universities, even with regard to their student health care coverage.
In a fractured decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Trump Administration’s 2018 rule, at least for now. It is not clear from their fractured opinions whether the opinion resulted in a flat-out win or simply a remand. At least 2 of the Justices (Breyer and Kagan) whose votes are included in the 7-vote majority, wrote a concurrence outlining why they believe the Trump Administration may ultimately lose the case on remand. Commentators have already begun noting their belief that the case will not be successful on remand and is likely to return on appeal to the Supreme Court.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2020-07-09 00:18:002020-07-08 12:37:22Supreme Court expands religious exemption from Obamacare contraceptive requirements to private employers
In 2018, the Supreme Court rejected, in a decision titled Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the argument that Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act’s protections for protected concerted activity somehow encompass a right to file class action and collective action lawsuits. There the Supreme Court held that, accordingly, employers can require pre-dispute arbitration agreements, even if it means such agreements block class and collective actions.
The Board recently was faced with a case on the issue and adopted the Supreme Court’s approach, restating that the NLRA does not bar arbitration agreements, even if they have that effect. In doing so, the NLRB clarified that employers are still prohibited from retaliating against employees who choose to act together by filing a class or collective action. “We reaffirm, however, longstanding precedent establishing that Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from disciplining or discharging employees for engaging in concerted legal activity, which includes filing a class or collective action with fellow employees over wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment.”
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2019-09-24 04:20:442019-08-23 16:22:13NLRB implements Supreme Court’s 2018 decision on arbitration agreements
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its recent ruling in Epic Resourcesthat arbitration agreements, even mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, bar class actions, even when silent on the subject. In doing so, the Supreme Court declined to adopt a standard that would have required such agreements to “clearly and unmistakably” permit class actions, ensuring the issue of just how much an arbitration agreement can and cannot say on the issue of class actions will continue to be litigated. For now, its decision, combined with Epic, mean, at least, that silence is itself a bar to class actions in arbitration.
In this decision the Supreme Court extended its Epic ruling even over what the lower courts had held was contrary California law. The lower courts had held that California law would permit arbitration of class action claims if the arbitration agreement was, although not silent, at least ambiguous on the issue. The lower courts had held that such amibiguity should be interpreted against the company, as the drafter of the agreement. The Supreme Court held here, no, federal public policy under the Federal Arbitration Agreement called for any ambiguity to be interpreted in favor of arbitration, without class actions.
The decision was a tough 5-4 split for the justices, with J. Kagan authoring a vigorous dissent.
The majority’s reasoning suggests other state laws that attempt to chip away at mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are likely to fall if challenged. However, employers should remember that, at least as written, this decision does not expressly mandate the reversal of state laws like California’s notorious fairness factors (Armendariz).
Employers wishing to adopt language that expressly blocks class actions in arbitration, or even, for example, to delete their current opt-out (or opt-in) provisions, may wish to consider the effects first. As other employers have begun to see, blocking class action claims in arbitration can guaranty the filing of mass individual demands for arbitration, which may prove much more costly and time-consuming than the class action.
Source: Lamps Plus v. Varela, — S.Ct. —, case no. 17-988 (4/24/19).
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2019-05-07 12:36:382019-04-26 12:37:47Supreme Court reaffirms its ruling on arbitration agreements as bars to class actions, begins chipping away at state laws to the contrary
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in a potentially landmark Equal Pay Act case, because … “Federal judges are appointed for life, not for eternity.” In this per curiam decision, the Supreme Court, not surprisingly, held that a judge needs to be alive to issue a ruling in a case.
How could the Ninth Circuit have thought otherwise? It was an exceedingly controversial case. The Ninth Circuit would have split evenly without the deceased judge’s vote, so the Ninth Circuit, oddly, decided to go ahead and count his vote. In fairness he had expressed his intent to vote one way, and had actually authored an opinion accordingly. He unfortunately passed away though before the opinion was issued. The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred by continuing to count his vote (in this case and others). The Court explained that a judge’s vote cannot be counted until an opinion is filed, especially because “a judge may change his or her position up to the very moment when a decision is released.”
Because Judge Reinhardt was no longer a judge at the time when the en banc decision in this case was filed, the Ninth Circuit erred in counting him as a member of the majority. That practice effectively allowed a deceased judge to exercise the judicial power of the United States after his death. But federal judges are appointed for life, not for eternity.
The underlying case is very controversial. As explained in a previous blog post, the issue has the potential to bring a pay-history ban to all 50 states by way of federal common law, by interpreting the longstanding Equal Pay Act as effectively banning inquiries and consideration of pay history.
A per curiam decision is a decision issued by a court with more than one judge (like the Supreme Court and other appellate courts) that is authored by the court itself, without identifying one or more individual judge’s contributions to the writing of the opinion or even votes in the case. It is not signed by anyone judge (though individual judges may, if they choose, sign dissents).
Source: Yovino v. Rizo, 586 U.S. —, case no. 18-272 (2/25/19)
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2019-02-28 10:09:212019-02-25 10:09:58Supreme Court reverses Ninth Circuit because … “Federal judges are appointed for life, not for eternity”
A trio of recent cases illustrateS how federal and state courts in California continue to struggle with their efforts to reconcile the recent pro-arbitration rulings by the Supreme Court with the historically anti-arbitration approach in California.
In NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Pickett, the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals held that an employee was required, under the Supreme Court’s 2009 14 Penn Plaza decision, to arbitrate individual employment discrimination claims under his union’s collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration clause, which read “neither the Union nor any aggrieved employee may file an action or complaint in court on any claim that arises under [an anti-discrimination clause], having expressly waived the right to so file.”
While that seemed to be a relatively straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s arbitration cases, the California Court of Appeals seemed to make the waters muddier in a pair of other cases.
In one case, Del Rosario Martinez v. Ready Pac Produce, Inc., the California Court of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court ruled in its 2011 Concepcion case and then in its 2018 Epic Resources case that an arbitration agreement is enforceable even if it means the employee is unable to pursue a class action. In line with those decisions, the Court held that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate her wage claims even though she was unable to pursue a class action.
However, in the other case, Ramos v. Superior Court of San Francisco County, the California Court of Appeals considered the same Supreme Court decisions and held they did not alter the fundamental underlying approach that California has taken against arbitration of employment claims, since the California Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Armendariz. Under the Armendariz approach, the Court then held the arbitration agreement in this case was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable under California law, even though it would have been enforceable under federal law:
In sum, the arbitration agreement as applied to Ramos’s statutory and wrongful termination claims contains four unconscionable terms. The provisions requiring Ramos to pay half the costs of arbitration, pay her own attorney fees, restricting the ability of the panel of arbitrators to “override” or “substitute its judgment” for that of the partnership, and the confidentiality clause, are unconscionable and significantly inhibit Ramos’s ability to pursue her unwaivable statutory claims. Because we are unable to cure the unconscionability simply by striking these clauses, and would instead have to reform the parties’ agreement in order to enforce it, we must find the agreement void as a matter of law.
These three cases don’t answer every, or even most, questions about arbitration agreements in California employment cases. They do illustrate the federal and state courts continuing efforts to try to reconcile California’s Armendariz approach with the Supreme Court’s. Employers who wish to utilize arbitration agreements in California should carefully consider their options.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2019-02-26 16:16:102019-02-27 05:54:06California continues its contortions over arbitration agreements in employment cases
The Supreme Court held that a driver for a trucking company need not arbitrate wage and related claims, even though the driver is technically an independent contractor, not an employee. In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court, first, decided that such driving falls within the Federal Arbitration Act’s exclusion for transportation workers, meaning, the Court held, the FAA does not apply. The FAA is of course the federal law that permits the arbitration of federal lawsuits. Next, the Supreme Court held that the FAA’s exclusion applies not only to employees but independent contractors.
Applicability of the decision is expected to be argued in a number of pending cases, including lawsuits brought by independent contractors who drive for social media based delivery services.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2019-01-15 15:52:242019-01-15 15:52:24Supreme Court ruled driver wasn’t required to arbitrate
In a move Bruce Lee would have admired, a group of 12,501 drivers seeking to assert wage-hour and related claims against Uber — faced with having each executed arbitration agreements — have filed a Petition in the federal courts for the Northern District of California demanding just that, 12,501 individual arbitrations.
The Petition illustrates what is likely to become a powerful tactic for would-be class/collective action plaintiffs who find themselves otherwise stymied by arbitration agreements that do not permit class/collective actions. As reported here, the U.S. Supreme Court recently endorsed arbitration agreements as effective tools against class/collective action litigation. This move turns that tool back onto the employer itself.
The drivers allege that, as early as August 18, 2018, they began submitting claims to arbitration under the arbitration agreements. The drivers allege that, as of the time of the Petition, 12,501 demands for arbitration had been submitted.
Of those 12,501 demands, in only 296 has Uber paid the initiating filing
fees necessary for an arbitration to commence. Out of those matters, only 47 have
appointed arbitrators, and out of those 47, in only six instances has Uber paid the
retainer fee of the arbitrator to allow the arbitration to move forward..
Why hasn’t Uber (allegedly) paid the arbitrator’s retainer fees in the other cases? Well, if true, it might be related to the (alleged) fact that (according to the Petition, the fee in each such case is a “NON-REFUNDABLE filing fee of $1,500 for each.” As in, according to the Petition, a total of $18,681,000 (12,501-47x$1,500), just to start each of the 12,501 cases.
Are the Uber drivers asking the court to, therefore, let them out of their arbitration agreements? Are they asking the court to allow them to pursue a class/collective action in court? No, because that would be contrary to recent Supreme Court decision. Instead, they’re asking the Court to order Uber to comply with the (alleged) arbitration agreements, starting by paying the initial arbitration fees. The Petition seeks other relief to include an order requiring Uber to continue to participate in each of the 12,501 arbitrations and to pay the drivers’ attorney fees and costs in prosecuting their Petition.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-12-18 15:44:482018-12-14 15:46:35Would-be class action plaintiffs jujitsu Uber’s arbitration agreement
Great time this morning on 850 KOA Colorado’s Morning News, discussing the Texas court’s recent ruling, holding that the Individual Mandate in Obamacare exceeds Congressional power and is inseverable from the remainder of Obamacare. Reminder, although the judge has struck down Obamacare, the judge has not yet issued a final ruling. How and whether the Texas court will issue an injunction freezing Obamacare is yet to be seen. Employers should continue to comply with Obamacare at this time.
The Supreme Court held earlier this year in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) should no longer be construed narrowly in favor of employees but should, instead, be given a “fair” reading based on its own language. The Supreme Court’s ruling has just seen its first application in a Circuit Court case, entitled Mosquera v. MTI Retreading Co., decided by the Sixth Circuit.
In Mosquera, the employee held an engineering degree but argued he spent less than 50% of his time doing work that required an engineering degree and should, therefore, not have been classified as a professional employee exempt from overtime. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The Sixth Circuit noted the evidence that had been submitted in support of the employer’s summary judgment motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s own affidavit to the contrary, saying it was “unsubstantiated” and “self-serving.” The Sixth Circuit noted that, prior to Encino Motorcars, it would have looked on the plaintiff’s claim more favorably, interpreting the professional exemption “narrowly,” but under the Supreme Court’s new ruling, it was required to give the law a broader “fair” reading instead. Under the new approach to FLSA, the Sixth Circuit held the employer’s motion for summary judgment was “compelling” and as such, it held, the employee was properly characterized as a professional who was exempt from overtime.
Mosquera is no doubt the first in a long line of cases to come that will take a less “narrow” approach to interpreting FLSA.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-08-14 15:55:002018-08-14 15:56:15Supreme Court’s new expansive reading of FLSA is applied for first time by a Circuit Court
Issued just before the Supreme Court’s Janus decision, a survey of union leader salaries is a stunning bookmark to the Court’s blockbuster decision holding that public employees cannot be required to pay “fair share” fees, much less dues, to unions. The survey is based on public filings by the unions. It lists total compensation packages for the 10 highest paid union presidents, ranging from $449,852 to $792,483, which the survey notes is several times higher than the average salary for CEOs, $196,050, as reported by the U.S. B.L.S. Statistics like this are likely to continue to fuel right-to-work legislation and Janus-related litigation across the country.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-07-24 08:57:582018-07-24 16:45:16Union Leader Salaries Soar
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-06-28 22:15:312018-08-16 09:20:09Want to hear my thoughts on recent developments at the Supreme Court?
The Supreme Court ruled that unions cannot charge government workers a “fair share” representation fee, much less union dues. The decision may well be beginning of the end for America’s unions, at least as the political and social juggernauts that we’ve come to know.
What’s a “fair share” fee? A “fair share” fee is like dues, but is less than dues. It’s just the portion of dues that represents the union’s cost of representing the workers. A “fair share” fee is often also referred to as a representation fee. Under this ruling a union cannot charge government workers either dues or even just a “fair share” fee.
What was the Supreme Court’s reasoning? Because the First Amendment protects a person’s right to choose whether or not to speak in support of various things. The fact that a union might want to use money to support its political agenda for example might be important for the union, it might even be very helpful to the workers, but particular individuals may choose not to support that speech. Therefore the Supreme Court held that a union can’t force government workers to give it money if the worker doesn’t want to support the union’s speech.
Why does this apply only to government workers? This case was decided under the First Amendment, which only applies as to governmental action. The First Amendment does not protect workers at private companies. This doesn’t mean private-company employees have no rights, they just don’t have First Amendment rights. Instead, they always have the right under federal labor law to refuse to pay full “dues” and instead can pay the reduced “fair share” representation fee, and in some states with right-to-work laws, they can even refuse to pay “fair share” fees.
Why is this case so important? Many commentators think this case signals the end of unionism as America has known it for more than a century. Union representation has been steadily declining for decades. Unions represent only 34% of the government workforce and 6% of the private workforce, with many such private-company workers at construction companies that do work for the government. This case — having given government workers the right to refuse to pay even “fair share” fees — is likely to cause a precipitous decline in the revenue streams for unions overall — the Supreme Court noted these fees have aggregated to “billions of dollars” over the years. The decline in revenue streams is in turn likely to result in a greatly reduced ability for unions overall to support political movements.
Can this decision be overruled by Congress? No, only the Supreme Court can decide what the Constitution does and does not permit, so only a future Supreme Court could reverse this decision.
In announcing this highly controversial 5-4 decision, the majority recognized the impact its ruling is likely to have on unions.
We recognize that the loss of payments from nonmembers may cause unions to experience unpleasant transition costs in the short term, and may require unions to make adjustments in order to attract and retain members. But we must weigh these disadvantages against the consider able windfall that unions have received under Abood for the past 41 years. It is hard to estimate how many billions of dollars have been taken from nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the First Amendment. Those unconstitutional exactions cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely.
In contrast, the dissent noted that, in order to reach this result, the majority had overruled more than 40 years of precedent.
There is no sugarcoating today’s opinion. The majority overthrows a decision entrenched in this Nation’s law—and in its economic life—for over 40 years. As a result, it prevents the American people, acting through their state and local officials, from making important choices about workplace governance. And it does so by weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.
Right or wrong, this case is now the Supreme Court’s ruling and likely to have a major impact on unionism in America.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-06-27 12:01:072018-06-27 12:01:07Is this the end of unions in America? The Supreme Court’s “fair share” ruling in five questions
By 7-2, the Supreme Court ruled for the baker in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case. All seven of the judges that formed the majority were struck by comments from the Colorado Civil Rights Commissioners that evidenced an anti-religious bias among the Commissioners when they decided the case. The Supreme Court called those comments “inappropriate,” “dismissive,” and “disparag(ing) of religion.”
What were these unacceptable comments? Well, in short, they included what can only be described as a gratuitous rant by one Commissioner about how, in her opinion, “religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust … we can list hundreds of situations.” It really didn’t help when the Commission, faced with three different cases involving bakers who refused to sell anti-gay marriage cakes, held for each of those bakers. The Supreme Court held that, pulling that all together, it seemed the Commission had made its decision not on the evidence and law but “the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.”
Along those lines, Justice Gorsuch, in his concurrence, noted that, if the government could make decisions on the basis of what it deems offensive, freedome of speech and expression would be lost. This is the oft-recognized principle that the only speech that really needs Constitutional protection is offensive speech.
The Constitution protects not just popular religious exercises from the condemnation of civil authorities. It protects them all.
In reversing based on the Commission’s own bias, the Supreme Court never reached the underlying question whether/when does a baker/florist/other expressive craftsman have a First Amendment right to refuse to sell their good/service to a consumer for religious reasons. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the baker had at least been entitled to a fair hearing of that issue, and that the Commission’s own bias had stripped him of that right.
(T)he delicate question of when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance the State sought to reach. That requirement, however, was not met here. When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not do so with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.
Justice Kennedy — who has been the Court’s champion of both gay rights and speech rights, as well as religious liberty rights — wrote the majority opinion. He acknowledged that the Court was dodging the real question of how to balance those rights.
The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts….
Still, his opinion suggested how he thought the Court should rule in future cases.
Some examples of cases where he suggested future bakers/florists/etc. might lose on the merits included the following:
A baker who “refused to sell any goods or any cakes for gay weddings”
Some examples of future cases where bakers/etc. might win included the following:
A “refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the cake”
A “refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right way”
A “refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it”
Separate opinions in Masterpiece Cakeshop seemed to preview how the Justices might vote:
Justice Gorsuch wrote suggesting that he is likely to rule broadly for future bakers/florists/etc.
Justice Thomas wrote along such lines as well, though his opinion suggested concern over the concept of even trying to protect the rights of a gay couple in this type of circumstance.
Justices Kagan and Breyer, who joined the majority in this case, suggested they would lean split on future cases, ruling against bakers/etc., where there is no evidence of anti-religiouis bias among the state agencies.
Justice Ginsburg joined by Justice Sotomayor wrote to express their concerns that the anti-religious comments by the Commission, while unacceptable, were simply not so substantial as to warrant reversal; they would have ruled on the merits, and in doing so, for the gay couple who wished to buy the cake.
That means future cases are likely to have 4 Justices inclined to rule for and 4 Justices inclined to rule against the bakers/florists/etc., and as was expected here, Justice Kennedy is likely to be the swing vote. Expect to see him flesh out his balancing test based on those examples.
As for future cases, Justice Kennedy gave one word of warning — frankly simply restating the concern most of America seemingly has had and had hoped the Supreme Court would wrestle with in this decision — that these rights must be balanced such that religious liberty is not so broadly defined that it becomes an easy excuse for discrimination:
And any decision in favor of (a future) baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons.
Readers of course will note that this concern exists not only as to LGBTQ individuals (which is all that quote discusses) but also individuals on the basis of race, gender, age, etc., and, yes, even religion. It simply cannot be the law that a business may refuse to do business on the grounds that a consumer is of a different race, color, gender or even religion.
Readers should also note that this line of cases isn’t just about consumers, and it certainly isn’t about just cakes. This line of cases has potential to touch all aspects of American life. It cannot be, for example, that a business has a right to refuse to hire someone simply because they assert a religious belief against that person’s sexual orientation, gender preference, race, gender, religion, etc.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-06-04 12:28:282018-06-04 12:30:25SCOTUS rules for baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop
In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court may have given employers — at least in some states — to block class and collective actions. The Court ruled that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), even in employment cases, and even as a block against class/collective actions. The Court had previously so ruled in the context of consumer contracts. In this case, the Supreme Court extended that ruling to employment agreements.
This ruling means companies can now lawfully require — at least under federal law — both consumers (as a condition of buying their product or service) and now employees (as a condition of working for the company) to agree,
Before any dispute ever arises,
To submit any future possible disputes to arbitration,
Instead of litigating them in court, and
Unless otherwise spelled out in the arbitration agreement, to waive any future rights to participate in class or collective actions.
In extending its ruling to employment cases, the Court rejected the argument that the National Labor Relations Act protects an employee’s right to join class/collective actions.
Perhaps of greatest importance the Court signaled a sharp curtailing of precedent holding that courts must defer to administrative agencies. That principle is called Chevron deference (after the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). Chevron deference has become highly controversial and is seen by conservative legal theorists as the chief vehicle for creation of the so-called administrative state. Here the issue of Chevron deference was raised because the National Labor Relations Board had held that the statute it oversees, the National Labor Relations Act, does include protection for class/collective actions and therefore should have rendered illegal the agreement at-issue. Over a heated dissent, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA was entitled to deference. Whether this portends an end to Chevron deference or will prove an isolated ruling remains to be seen.
A “collective” action is like a class action. Some laws, notably, some wage-hour laws (such as minimum wage and overtime laws) permit “collective” actions instead of class actions. Simply put, the difference is that in a class action, the judge declares the existence of a class, and class members opt out of the class if they do not wish to participate; whereas, in a collective action, members must opt in to join the class.
Employers that have previously been concerned about stepping into the waters of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements may now wish to consult with counsel about doing so. Employers should remember that, although this is a strong case for employers, it does not necessarily apply to claims brought under state laws, and some states, notably both New York and California, have taken strong positions against this type of agreement.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-05-21 11:48:162018-05-21 11:49:05Supreme Court upholds mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, even when they bar class/collective actions
Historically courts have interpreted the overtime exemptions in FLSA (the Fair Labor Standards Act) narrowly in favor of employees. This “narrow construction” doctrine has made it difficult to treat employees who may be exempt as such unless they clearly fit an exemption. Now, the Supreme Court has rejected the “narrow construction” doctrine, ruling that it has not been “a useful guidepost for interpreting FLSA.”
The Supreme Court held that FLSA’s overtime obligations consist of two basic chunks of statutory language: The first requires employees to be paid overtime; the second chunk of language is a series of exemptions from that general rule. The Supreme Court held that FLSA provided courts with no basis for giving the first chunk of language any greater significance than the second chunk, in other words, to read the overtime requirement broadly at the expense of having to read the exemptions narrowly. Instead the Supreme Court held, both chunks of language should be given equal importance. The Supreme Court called this a “fair reading.”
Those exemptions are as much a part of theFLSA’s purpose as the overtime-pay requirement. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (“Legislation is, after all, the art of compromise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms often the price of passage”). We thus have no license to give the exemption anything but a fair reading.
Having rejected the narrow-construction doctrine, and instead applying its fair-reading doctrine, the Supreme Court then held that, in this case, service advisors at the car dealership in question qualified for an overtime exemption under FLSA’s special exemption for salesmen at car dealerships.
It is likely this ruling will have substantial impact in all FLSA overtime cases. It will not be limited to the FLSA’s exemption for salesmen at car dealerships. Rather the fair-reading doctrine will substantially expand the reach of all of FLSA’s overtime exemptions.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-04-06 12:59:042018-04-06 12:59:04Under the Supreme Court’s new “fair reading” doctrine, will FLSA exemptions be interpreted more broadly?
Dodd-Rank is the nation’s leading securities-related whistleblower law. What if an individual complains, not to the SEC, but to the company at-issue, is a mere internal complaint to the company sufficient to trigger Dodd-Frank’s protections? In a unanimous 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court, after reviewing the text of Dodd-Frank itself, held the answer was clear: Congress wrote Dodd-Frank to protect only complaints to the SEC. Therefore a complaint to the company at-issue, alone, is insufficient to trigger Dodd-Frank’s protections.
The case is also notable for the absence of analysis regarding Chevron deference. Chevron deference is the legal term used to refer to the practice of courts deferring to agency interpretations of statutes. Here, while Dodd-Frank itself clearly required a complaint to the SEC, the SEC had interpreted the language more broadly, saying that a complaint to a company alone should also be protected. The concept of Chevron deference has become quite controversial, and commentators anticipated this might be the case by which the Supreme Court revisited the topic. However, the Supreme Court, having decided the language of the statute itself was clear, had no opportunity to do so. The continuing viability of Chevron deference remains an issue for another case to resolve.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2018-03-14 17:46:182018-03-15 06:46:23To be a Dodd-Frank whistleblower, individual must complain to SEC
Prior case law had suggested and many litigators had assumed that the deadline for filing an appeal in a federal lawsuit is jurisdictional, meaning it cannot be waived or extended and must be met at the risk of losing an otherwise meritorious appeal. In a recent case, the appellant requested and received, before her deadline to appeal, a 2-month extension of the deadline to appeal. That extension was one month more than the federal rules allow. Those federal rules are adopted by the courts, specifically the Supreme Court, they are not laws made by Congress.
The appellate court held that the deadline for her to appeal was jurisdictional and therefore the lower court had lacked authority to extend it so long. Accordingly the appellate court dismissed her appeal.
A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed. While the rule is in fact a rule, and failure to file a timely appeal still generally will warrant a dismissal, the Supreme Court held that the deadline is not jurisdictional. It is merely a rule of court. It may be extended. To be jurisdictional, the Supreme Court held, it would have had to have been the product of Congressional legislation; the Supreme Court held it does not itself have the authority to create jurisdictional deadlines in its own rules. Accordingly, the dismissal of the appeal was vacated.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2017-11-15 12:37:222017-11-09 12:37:37Supreme Court holds deadline for appealing a federal lawsuit is not jurisdictional
Sometimes, companies sign collective bargaining agreements (CBA), not realizing that each promises the same work to different unions. In this case, the employer allegedly signed one CBA that promised forklift and skidster work to the Operating Engineers and another CBA that promised the same work to Laborers. This can create a jurisdictional dispute; in other words, it can lead the two unions to argue over the work.
Under section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has authority to decide which union gets the work in a jurisdictional dispute.
In this 10(k) case, the Board decided that the Operating Engineers not the Laborers had the better claim to forklift and skidster work. Despite the Board’s ruling, the Laborers sued the company for benefits under its collective bargaining agreement. In effect, the Laborers argued that the Operating Engineers could have the work, but the company should have to pay benefits to both unions’ trust funds. The law that governs liability for benefits is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The Laborers argued that the Board’s 10(k) authority only extends to determinations of which union has the better claim to the work under the NLRA, not to which union is entitled to benefits under ERISA.
The Circuit Courts are split on the issue. The Third, Ninth, District of Columbia and now Sixth Circuits hold that the Board’s 10(k) ruling governs the ERISA claim, meaning the losing union has no claim to the work under the NLRA or for benefit payments under ERISA. The Seventh Circuit has held otherwise.
The split in Circuit Courts foretells possible Supreme Court review, especially because, here, even as it joined the majority of other Circuits, the Sixth Circuit did so over a strong dissent.
Employers with multiple CBAs should carefully review the way each of their agreements describes covered work. Overlapping descriptions should be clarified.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2017-05-01 19:22:412017-06-01 11:06:13Supreme Court review over benefits liability likely in union jurisdictional disputes
In a decision that probably surprised no one except the often-reversed and reversed-in-this-case Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that a trial court, not an appellate court, is in the best position to review the particulars of a subpoena.
Interestingly, the decision, which can be seen as reinforcing the EEOC’s ability to issue subpoenas – or at least reducing judicial scrutiny over EEOC subpoenas – was technically a loss for the EEOC. The EEOC had issued a subpoena for contact information for employees who’d taken a certain test, nationwide. The company objected, and the trial court agreed with the company, holding the EEOC’s nationwide request was overly broad. The EEOC then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which ruled it could review the trial court’s ruling de novo (from scratch) without having to give the trial court any deference. The Supreme Court disagreed and sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit. Now, the EEOC will decide if it still wants the information, and if so, it will have the heavy burden of proving not only that it is entitled to the information but that the trial court was so wrong when it decided otherwise that it abused its discretion.
While the EEOC lost the Supreme Court case, companies should be mindful of the overarching lesson: The EEOC has broad subpoena power, and a trial court may now be the only judicial body with substantial authority to hear a challenge to an EEOC subpoena.
For an example of how EEOC subpoenas are analyzed for enforceability, see this posting.
https://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.png00Bill C. Bergerhttps://l2slegal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/logo-orig.pngBill C. Berger2017-05-01 19:26:502017-06-01 11:04:03Supreme Court holds that trial court analysis of EEOC subpoena’s enforceability is entitled to discretion, not de novo review.