Tag Archive for: Colorado Court of Appeals

Colorado Court of Appeals holds that a banquet service fee is not a tip and therefore banquet server is not a tipped employee

The Colorado Court of Appeals held that a banquet server was entitled to overtime because he was not exempt under Colorado’s wage-hour laws as a tipped employee. The employer charged a service fee of 22% that was shared with all the servers, including plaintiff, allowing him to earn between $11.36 and $33.05 per hour depending on the amount of banquet sales.

Even though the service charge varied with the amount of sales, as a tip generally does, and even though in the, in the aggregate, it was well in excess of minimum wage, the court held that it did not constitute a tip because, because unlike a tip, which must be voluntary, banquet clients could not decide whether or how much of it to pay. Rather the company simply charged all banquet clients 22% of food and drink.

Additionally, the court rejected the company’s argument at the banquet server was exempt as a sales employee. The company had argued that by providing excellent service the banquet server enhanced sales, but the Court noted he had no actual sales responsibilities.

The case is of particular interest, because it illustrates how Colorado’s new wage-hour laws are likely to be applied by the CDLE and Colorado courts.

First the court was very clear that it was not deciding the case from scratch (“de novo”). Rather than the court explained, it was required to defer to the CDLE’s hearing officer’s decision, unless it was proven to be unsupported by substantial evidence or contrary to the plain meaning of Colorado’s wage-hour laws. The court went to some length to explain that it thought the company had raised a good argument that the service charge should have been considered a tip. But because the issue was arguable either way, the court felt it was required to defer to the CDLE’s hearing officer. 

Second the court noted that the case actually began with the plaintiff, incorrectly, trying to argue that he was, in fact, tipped. When he filed his claim, he argued that he had been shorted the amounts due him under Colorado’s tipped employee laws. When the CDLE investigated, it determined he was wrong, that he wasn’t tipped. But the CDLE didn’t stop there. Rather, it restructured his claim, then reconsidered his circumstances under the non-tipped employee wage-hour laws, and under those laws, laws that the plaintiff apparently had not himself put at-issue, the CDLE awarded him overtime under its own theory.

Thus, the case illustrates how the new Colorado wage-hour laws allow the CDLE broad discretion not only to decide the wage-hour claims filed before it, but also to decide how to structure those wage-hour claims in order to best award relief it determines is owed.

The case was Brennan v. Broadmoor Hotel, Inc.

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Colorado Court of Appeals certifies class in wage lawsuit for rest breaks but not meal periods

Colorado wage law affords employees (1) a 30-minute meal period, subject to a number of requirements and conditions, which, if circumstances on a given day make it impractical to take, requires that the employee be paid for the time spent working instead and further that the employee be allowed an on-the-clock opportunity to consume a meal and (2) a 10-minute rest break for every 4 hours of work, again subject to a number of requirements and conditions. In Hicks v. Colorado Hamburger Co., the Colorado Court of Appeals was confronted with a case in which the timecards for workers in multiple locations allegedly did not show workers’ meal periods or rest breaks. A single worker at one location filed suit alleging he had not been granted them as required by Colorado law and further, he alleged, his co-workers at his and the other locations had similarly not been granted them. He sought a right to pursue his claims not only on his own individual behalf but on behalf of a class consisting of his co-workers at all locations.

The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that his claim for rest break violations could be pursued as a class action, but the court refused to certify a class on his meal periods. The Court held that the timcards’ silence on the meal periods did not evidence whether there had been a meal period violation because, the Court noted, the employees may have been allowed to consume the on-the-break meal as permitted by and in accordance with the requirements of Colorado law; therefore, the Court held that class certificaiton would be inappropriate since every workers’ right to a meal period on any given day would be subject to individual analysis over just what exactly happened to them that day. However, the Court found the timecards’ silence as to rest breaks indicative of a possible claim because it held that the timecards’ silence did indicate, at least in the Court’s view of the circumstances of this case, that all workers may have been denied the required rest breaks.

The Court’s decision should not be read as a simple rule that all Colorado state law claims for rest breaks may be brought as class actions and that no Colorado state law meal period claims may be brought as class actions. The Court’s ruling may be limited to the facts before it, which the Court discussed in detail explaining its reasoning why the timecards’ silence, at least on the record before it in this case, warranted the different outcomes.  It is also noted that the Court’s ruling did not address whether it was or wasn’t likely that any violation actually occurred; the case was simply over whether either claim could be pursued on behalf of a class. The Court’s ruling does not reflect any likely outcome on the merits.

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Colorado Court of Appeals holds, and new COMPS Order 37 confirms, that Colorado state wage laws, like federal wage laws, exempt interstate drivers even if the driver himself does not cross state lines

The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the “interstate driver” exemption in the Colorado state wage laws (including the COMPS Orders), like federal wage law (including FLSA), exempts drivers who transport goods moved in interstate commerce, even if the driver himself only drives the final leg of transport within the state, without himself crossing state lines, especially where the driver is covered by DOT driver regulations.   The case brings Colorado in line with other courts to address the issue.

Source: Gomez v. JP Trucking, Inc., case no. 17CA2384, 2020 COA 153 (Colo.App. 11/5/2020).

Updated: Shortly after the Court issued its decision, the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (CDLE) issued COMPS Order 37, in which it appears to have reversed its prior position in COMPS Order 36, which was rejected by the Court in Gomez, and now agrees with the ruling in Gomez; however, the CDLE included in its new COMPS Order 37, rules 2.4.6 and 2.2.6, where it mandates as a condition of such exemption, that such drivers also are paid at least 50 hours of pay at minimum wage, with overtime, which calculates in 2021 to be a minimum weekly payment of $677.60.

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Colorado Court of Appeals rules for employer on vacation issue

In a previous post, it was noted that a case has been pending before the Colorado Court of Appeals involving an employer’s refusal to pay vacation at separation, despite the provisions of CRS 8-4-101 and a new regulation promulgated by the CDLE thereunder. The Court of Appeals has now ruled in the case, Blount v. Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, that the employer was within its rights to refuse to pay out the vacation because it had clearly stated in its vacation policy that “Unused Vacation Allowances are not paid to Team Member at any time, including upon termination of employment.” The unpublished decision was not selected for official publication. It is also noted, as explained in this blog’s previous post, that this ruling is in apparent conflict and arguably contrary to the CDLE’s recent regulations and that the issue is currently pending before the Colorado Supreme Court in a different lawsuit.

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Colorado Court of Appeals issues strong ruling on “horizontal veil piercing”

The Colorado Court of Appeals issued a strong decision involving “horizontal veil piercing.” The case involved a junior creditor suing his debtor and its senior creditor, alleging that the debtor and senior creditor were commonly owned. The debtor was owned in large part (81.25%) by the same five owners who owned 100% of a third company, which in turn owned 100% of the senior creditor. The junior creditor argued that the corporate veils between the entities should be pierced, that they were all “alter egos” of each other. The debtor argued that the senior creditor had been created solely for the purpose of holding the senior debt, which had subordinated his own claim.

Although the trial court had ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that the sister entities’ veils could only be pierced if the corporate veil between each of the entities and their respective owners were pierced. Here the court held that the plaintiff had failed to muster sufficient evidence to warrant piercing all of the corporate veils involved.

In so ruling the court re-affirmed that it is not sufficient to show common owners, and/or even common officers and directors. Commonality of owners, officers and directors is common in corporate structuring. Additionally it was not sufficient to show that the one entity had been (arguably) created for the purpose of holding the senior debt simply to keep the plaintiff subordinate; even if true, holding a note is a lawful purpose for which an entity may be formed.

Source: Dill v. Rembrandt Group, Inc., 2020 COA 69 (Colo.App. 4/16/2020).

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Colorado Court of Appeals clarifies unemployment eligibility rules related to marijuana use

The Colorado Court of Appeals has clarified how Colorado’s medical and recreational marijuana laws impact eligibility for unemployment. The case involved an unusual fact pattern that provided the court with a springboard to articulate four rules. The worker was on medical leave, but worked for a financial institution to which he personally owed money. Although he was on medical leave, he still had to come in occasionally to make payments on the loan he owed his employer. While there to make a payment, HR advised that he had come up for a random drug test, on which he tested positive for marijuana. Thus the Court was faced with a case where the person was still an employee but obviously not engaged in or even able to be engaged in actively performing job duties at the time he was tested.

The lower court looked at only one subsection of the unemployment-eligibility statute, CRS 8-73-108(5)(e)(IX.5). Subsection IX.5 renders a worker who tests positive for even otherwise lawful marijuana to be ineligible for unemployment if the test was taken “during working hours.” Because the employee was on medical leave, the court held his positive test did not arise from a sample taking “during working hours.” The lower court then held that because subsection IX.5 was so specific to marijuana, it was not able to look at other sections of the statute.

The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals held that other subsections still apply, not just IX.5. Looking at all the other subsections, the Colorado Court of Appeals held there are at least four ways a worker can be disqualified form receiving unemployment in Colorado due to otherwise lawful marijuana use:

  1. A positive test “during working hours”;
  2. A positive test during or outside working hours that had or could have had an adverse impact on the company;
  3. A positive test during or outside working hours that interfered with the employee’s job performance;
  4. A positive test during or outside working hours that rendered the employee unable to meet “established job performance or other defined standard.”

Here is the full quote from the Colorado Court of Appeals:

Any conflict among the provisions at issue in this case is not irreconcilable.  Subsection (IX.5) disqualifies an individual for the sole reason that he or she had a positive drug or alcohol test while working, essentially dispensing with the need for an employer to establish any impairment of the employee’s abilities or adverse effect on the employer’s business.  However, subsection (VII) would apply where an employee violates an employer’s rule prohibiting drug use, whether on or off the job, but an employer would be required to demonstrate that the employee’s drug use had, or could have had, adverse impacts on the company.  Similarly, subsection (VIII) could be applied to off-the-job drug use but requires proof that the drug use interfered with the employee’s job performance.  And subsection (XX), when applied in a drug use or testing scenario, requires the employer to establish that an employee’s drug use or failed drug test caused him or her to fail to meet an established job performance or other defined standard.  Because there is no irreconcilable conflict, all provisions of the statute are amenable to harmonious construction, and thus must be given effect.  

Source: M&A Acquisition Corp. v. ICAO, — P.3d —, case no. 19CA0679 (Colo.App. 11/21/19).

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Colorado trial courts are not required to blue-pencil non-compete and non-solicit covenants

Even where an agreement says that covenants “shall be” blue-penciled (meaning, rewritten if determined to be unenforceable and narrowed to whatever the court rules would have been enforceable), a trial court in Colorado is not required to do so. In a recent decision, 23 LTD v. Herman, case no. 16CA1095 (Colo.App. 7/25/19), the Colorado Court of Appeals confirmed blue penciling is within a trial court judge’s discretion. The parties cannot, by way of mandatory language like “shall,” not only confer on the judge the authority to re-write their agreement but an obligation to do so.

Simply put, the court is not a party to the agreement, and the parties have no power or authority to enlist the court as their agent. Thus, parties to an employment or noncompete agreement cannot contractually obligate a court to blue pencil noncompete provisions that it determines are unreasonable.

The case is a strong reminder for employers not to over-reach when drafting covenants, non-competes or non-solicits. While a blue penciling clause may give the judge to make some changes like reducing the geographic or temporal reach of the covenant (how many miles/how many months), the parties should not expect a judge will be willing to make changes beyond that, or even of that nature. Whether to blue pencil at all is an issue for each judge.

Fundamentally, it is the obligation of a party who has, and wishes to protect, trade secrets to craft contractual provisions that do so without violating the important public policies of this state.[5] That responsibility does not fall on the shoulders of judges

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Three issues in Colorado regarding vacation pay

Colorado law, CRS 8-4-101 defines vacation to be a part of “wages” when “earned in accordance with the terms of any agreement. If an employer provides paid vacation for an employee, the employer shall pay upon separation from employment all vacation pay earned and determinable in accordance with the terms of any agreement between the employer and the employee.” As such, an employee cannot agree to waive vacation, or any other “wages,” once “earned, pursuant to CRS 8-4-121, and CRS 8-4-109 requires that such vacation, along with all other “wages,” to be paid out in final paychecks.

Despite what seems relatively clear statutory language on first blush, three issues persist. Colorado employers have received some fleshout on at least two.

1. Can an employer impose conditions on the payout of vacation in a final paycheck? The Colorado Court of Appeals says, yes.

A recent Colorado Court of Appeals case suggests the law may not be that simple. In  Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc.,  the employer added a twist in its handbook. There, a policy said that an employee “forfeits all earned vacation and pay benefits” if they fail to provide 2-week notice before quitting. The employee cited the foregoing statutes, arguing the vacation could not be waived and had to be paid out in the final paycheck.

The Court of Appeals held for the company. The Court of Appeals looked to the “terms of any agreement,” as required by the statute, in other words, to the language of the vacation policy and held that 2-week notice was a condition of earning the vacation.

Ms. Nieto’s right to compensation for accrued but unused vacation pay depends on the parties’ employment agreement. And that agreement unequivocally says that the vacation pay she seeks wasn’t vested given the circumstances under which she left the Market’s employ.

Is Nieto good law in Colorado, can employers rely comfortably on it? Many would argue that the Colorado Court of Appeals simply got it wrong. However, the deadline for appeal has now passed, so it is certainly the law as between Ms. Nieto and her former employer Clark’s Market, Inc. It is noted too that the decision was selected for official publication, so, unless the Court of Appeals or the Colorado Supreme Court revisit the issue in a future case, it is binding on trial courts. Therefore employers could arguably rely on it for now, so long as they are willing to risk protracted litigation and future appeals.

2. Can an employer apply a use-it-or-lose-it rule to vacation at the end of every year? The Colorado Division of Labor and Employment says, no, but the issue is pending in the Colorado Court of Appeals.

Pending before the Colorado Court of Appeals is Blount, Inc. v. CDLE, in which the Colorado Division of Labor and Employment is asking the Court of Appeals to rule against an employer’s purported use-it-or-lose-it policy. In an apparent effort to end-run the Court’s decision, the CDLE issued on the same day as it filed a brief in the appeal, a new rule (7 CCR 1103-7 rule 2.15) — which it then proceed to rely upon in its brief — stating that employers may not have use-it-or-lose-it policies. How will the Court of Appeals rule? How will the Court of Appeals view the CDLE’s apparent claim-jumping regulation? Will the Court of Appeals take Blount as an opportunity to re-consider or limit Nieto? Stay tuned.

3. Do these same rules apply to PTO or just vacation? The Division of Labor and Employment says, no, these restrictions do not apply to PTO.

As of this summer, callers to the Colorado Division of Labor and Employment will be told it takes the position that these “vacation” rules do not apply to PTO. CRS 8-4-101 speaks only to the inclusion of “vacation” in “wages,” not PTO; therefore, the Division will not currently pursue an administrative wage claim for PTO.

Notwithstanding, employers should realize that some plaintiff attorneys will take such claims to court, but they do so under a contract law theory, not under Colorado’s wage statutes, and as a contract claim, such claims do not carry attorney fees or penalties.

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You get what you get with arbitration, holds Colorado Court of Appeals

Employers considering adopting arbitration agreements might be interested in a recent decision by the Colorado Court of Appeals. The Court’s ruling highlights some of the major differences between litigating in courts and arbitrating before a private arbitrator.

The case involved an arbitration agreement that required arbitration of claims “arising” under the parties’ contract. One of the parties brought a claim for violation of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which is a separate claim that sounds in tort, not contract. The argument was that, because it is a tort claim not a contract claim, it was not subject to arbitration. Even though the arbitration agreement’s language was narrower than the more customary phrase, “related to or arising out of,” the Court held it was, nonetheless, broad enough to require arbitration of the tort claim.

Next, the arbitrator’s ruling was challenged on substantive grounds. The party contended the arbitrator had gone so far as to improperly re-characterize its claim, then deny the claim as re-characterized. The party felt it had never gotten a ruling on its actual, original claim. However, arbitration does not generally provide for a right of appeal. There are only very limited grounds for appeal. Additionally arbitration does not typically involve a court reporter being present, so there is generally no transcript of testimony. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that, even if the arbitrator had erred, there was no way for the Court of Appeals to analyze the arbitrator’s ruling, since with no transcript of testimony, it had no way of knowing what had occurred in the hearing.

We know from the arbitrator’s award that the evidentiary part of the hearing lasted two days, two witnesses testified, the arbitrator admitted about fifty-five exhibits, and the parties gave their closing arguments over the telephone. But we do not know what anyone said during the hearing. As a result, we must, as we have previously concluded, presume that the transcript would support the arbitrator’s award.

The case is a good reminder that, for all its advantages, arbitration comes with its own set of disadvantages. It isn’t just a quicker more private version of litigation. Companies considering arbitration agreements should carefully consider both the pro’s and con’s of arbitration.

Source: Digital Landscape v. Media Kings, case no. 17 CA 1111 (Colo.App. 9/20/18).

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Individual liability possible for wage claims, in Colorado

In a 2003 decision, Leonard v. McMorris, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado Wage Claim Act does not itself create statutory liability for individuals who own or manage a company. But what about other theories?

In a recent decision, Paradine v. Goei, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Leonard does not foreclose personal liability. Rather, it simply held that the Colorado Wage Claim Act itself cannot be a vehicle for imposing personal liability. The Colorado Court of Appeals held in this case that there are, at least, two other “well-established” theories for holding an individual liable for the acts of a company: “peircing the corporate veil, and when an officer acts on behalf of an undisclosed principal.” Oversimplifying these two principles, (1) the first allows a person to be held liable for the acts of his entity if, in running that entity, he has not obeyed corporate formalities and ignored the distinction between the entity and himself; (2) the latter allows a person to be held liable when he seems to have acted on his own behalf but later wishes to claim, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, that he was actually acting behind an entity.

In this case the Court of Appeals held the plaintiff had adequately pled a case to pierce the corporate veil and was, therefore, entitled to seek discovery in pursuit of his allegations. In particular the court noted the plaintiff alleged that the individual collected the company’s money to be used to pay wages, used the company’s revenues for “his own personal use” and “diverted corporate funds” to pay his own expenses, including his “apartment lease” and “vehicle payments,” treating the company as his “alter ego” while commingling bank accounts and credit cards.”

Paradine will no doubt stimulate the filing of individual liability claims in Colorado wage cases.

Source: Paradine v. Goei, case no. 16CA1909 (Colo.App. 4/19/18).

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When an “interstate” driver isn’t, but is …

Both federal law (the Fair Labor Standards Act, “FLSA”) and Colorado law (the Colorado Minimum Wage Act, the Colorado Wage Claim Act, and the Colorado Minimum Wage Order) exempt “interstate drivers.” Under FLSA, a driver can be considered “interstate” if she, like taxi drivers, is subject to the federal Motor Carrier Act, even where she drives only within the state. This means taxi drivers are not entitled to overtime under federal law.

In this case, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment’s view that Colorado intended a stricter approach. According to the Court and the DOLE, Colorado’s overtime exemption does require that a driver actually drive across state lines as part of their job. Accordingly, the Court held, Colorado taxi drivers are entitled to overtime under state law, even though they would not be under federal law. As the Court explained, FLSA permits states to adopt stronger protections for employees than federal law. Here, the Court held Colorado did so because Colorado’s overtime exemption is worded slightly differently than FLSA’s.

Remaining issues include the applicability of this ruling to “gig” drivers, like those who drive through Uber or Lyft. Also, while this case has held that taxi drivers who don’t actually drive in and outside the state are entitled to overtime, it did not address whether other parts of Colorado wage law, including minimum wage requirements, also apply to such drivers.

Source: Brunson v. Colorado Cab Company, LLC, case no. 16CA1864 (1/8/18).

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