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Seven Things You Need To Know About The DOL’s Proposed Salary Rules

Here are answers to seven common questions regarding the DOL’s recent proposal to increase the minimum guaranteed salary for overtime exempt positions.

1.    What has the DOL proposed?

As explained in a prior blog post, the DOL has just proposed increasing the minimum guaranteed salary for most overtime exempt positions from $455 per week ($23,660 per annum assuming the employee works some portion of 52 weeks per year, which amount could be less depending on actual vacation/etc.) to $679 per week ($35,308). It is expected this increase will affect approximately one million workers, who will have to be paid either a raise or overtime.

2.    When will the new minimum salary take effect?

Currently the DOL’s proposal is just that, a proposal. If the proposed rule becomes final, it is expected to take effect in January 2020. Many commentators believe that is likely.

3.    What does the DOL’s proposal mean for employers now?

Employers should begin reviewing their workforce for employees who are classified as overtime exempt to ensure that their salaries exceed the proposed new minimum ($679 per week).

4.    What are an employer’s options?

Employers will have two options for employees who are currently overtime exempt but earn less than the proposed minimum:

  1. Increase the employee’s guaranteed salary to meet the new proposed minimum ($679 per week); or,
  2. Convert the employee to hourly and pay overtime.

Technically there are at least two other options:

  •  Continue paying the current sub-minimum salary, but convert the position to overtime-eligible, then pay overtime on an hourly basis, at half-time, in addition to the salary, for workweeks when overtime is worked. This is called the “fluctuating workweek” method.
  • Continue paying the current salary under an agreement with the employee that the salary includes assumed overtime; pay no additional hourly (or salary) amounts to compensate employees for overtime hours. This is called a Belo agreement.”

Unfortunately while the fluctuating-workweek method and Belo agreements are theoretically available, and sound like ways to “build in” overtime into a salary, they are not as practical as employers (and employees) might hope. Each is disfavored by the DOL and the courts. Each is available only in strictly limited circumstances. Both options are beyond the scope of this article. Neither should be implemented except after consultation with experienced legal counsel.

5.    What are some of the most common considerations for employers weighing their options?

Analyzing the impact of these proposed regulations will depend greatly on the circumstances of every workforce. However, here are some of the most common considerations:

  • The number of workers (and the number of positions) currently overtime exempt but paid under the DOL’s proposed minimum.
  • The financial difference between each worker’s current salary and the DOL’s proposed minimum.
  • The likelihood of overtime hours and the feasibility of converting a currently salaried overtime-exempt worker to an hourly overtime-paid worker.
  • The increased cost of benefits that may be tied to pay (assuming a worker’s pay is increased) and any change to the level or type of benefits available (assuming a worker is converted to hourly).

To help employers with the math of comparing options, a number of spreadsheets are available on the Internet.

Additionally, employers are reminded that consideration should be given to two other features of this proposed rule that may affect the math of their analyses:

  • The ability to do a “catch-up” payment, which may help some employers meet the new proposed salary minimum.
  • The ability to exclude certain bonuses from overtime calculations, which may help other employers afford converting workers into overtime-eligible hourly positions.

Finally, employers should consider with their HR professionals the potential impact on workforce morale. This in particular will vary from company to company. Common questions include the following:

  • How will other workers respond to seeing these positions receive raises?
  • Will raises cause salary compression?
    • In other words, will lower level salaried employees start earning nearly as much as workers in skilled or even managerial level positions?
    • Will skilled and even managerial level positions need to be increased accordingly?
  • Is any part of the workforce unionized?
    • If so will converting salaried positions into hourly positions make them more likely to be claimed by union as part of its bargaining unit?
    • For positions already within a bargaining unit, employers are reminded of their collective bargaining obligations and to review with legal counsel, first, any requirements for notice and an opportunity to bargain, as well as the potential impact of a current agreement’s “zipper” clause.

6.    Reminder, employers still have to meet the “duties” tests for overtime exemptions

Employers are reminded that paying the minimum guaranteed salary is not all it takes to be exempt from overtime requirements. Workers must also meet the DOL’s duties tests for the various kinds of exemption.

7.    In what states will the DOL’s proposal affect employers?

If it becomes effective, the increase will take hold nationwide, at a federal level. Although it will apply in all fifty states, employers are reminded that some states, including Alaska, California and New York, already require minimum guaranteed salaries in excess of even this new proposed increase. Accordingly, employers in Alaska, California and New York should confirm with legal counsel but may find no change is required to their workers’ salary levels.

 

DOL proposes overhaul of Joint Employer rules

Following up on recent efforts by the NLRB to overhaul the Joint Employer doctrine, the DOL has proposed its own revisions.

Like the NLRB, the DOL proposes that the right to control not be considered, but rather that focus be on whether the putative joint employer actually has exercised control.

Only actions taken with respect to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment, rather than the theoretical ability to do so under a contract, are relevant to joint employer status under the Act.

Additionally, the DOL proposes to clarify that “whether an employee is economically dependent on the potential joint employer is (also) not relevant.”

Rather, the DOL suggests that four factors be considered to determine whether the putative joint employer exercised sufficient control, in actuality, to warrant liability:

The Department’s proposed test would assess whether the potential joint employer:

  • Hires or fires the employee;

  • Supervises and controls the employee’s work schedule or conditions of employment;

  • Determines the employee’s rate and method of payment; and

  • Maintains the employee’s employment records.

Source: DOL proposed rules re “Joint Employer Status Under The Fair Labor Standards Act,” 29 CFR Part 791, RIN 1235-aa26 (4/1/19).

Third Circuit expounds on class actions in wage claims

A class action is a way for one or more persons to sue on behalf of a voluminous group of similarly situated persons. The idea is that the claim may not be financially worthwhile for one or a few people to prosecute, but where many people have suffered the same wrong, it makes sense for them to litigate the claims all at once, just as it is more efficient for the courts and defendant.

Wage claims are often for relatively small amounts, when one considers only one plaintiff, but can be for huge amounts when prosecuted on behalf of a claim. Wage claims though aren’t technically called a class action. Wage claims are prosecuted under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which provides for “collective” actions; whereas, class actions are prosecuted under Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

What’s the difference between a class action and a collective action? Well, there aren’t many, but the few differences there are, are indeed significant. The biggest difference is conceptual and practical. In a class action, the judge declares a “class,” and members can opt out if they don’t wish to be part of the lawsuit. In a collective action (a FLSA wage claim), the judge declares the potential class, but members have to opt in to become part of the lawsuit.

There are other significant differences in terms of the procedures and standards court follow at the start of the case. Those differences can drive significant outcomes in terms of settlement strategies and litigation approaches.

Still, the differences can be as subtle as they are sometimes significant, triggering relatively frequent litigation in the courts. The Tenth Circuit has, for example, said, in a 2001 decision (Thiessen) that there is “little difference in the various approaches”  under Rule 23 for class actions versus FLSA for collective actions. However the Third Circuit, in a recent decision, Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., held the differences, though often slight, are significant enough that an appeal involving the one did not give it jurisdiction to consider issues related to the other. The Third Circuit, therefore, declined to decide whether certification of a collective action under FLSA was appropriate, even though it did decide that certification of a class under Rule 23 was inappropriate. The court left the collective action certification for the lower court and later litigation.

In so ruling, the court did, though, hold that the class action Rule 23 certification — the issue on appeal before it — had been improper. The Court clarified that, in order to prove that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging “off the clock” work was appropriate for class certification, Rule 23 required them to prove that they, and the requested class members, could all show that their rights were violated using the same evidence of liability. It was not sufficient to prove that they had all been wronged by the same employer, that they had all been shorted wages to which they should have been entitled, or even that they had all been shorted in the same way. Rule 23, the Third Circuit held, requires that they prove they, and the requested class, could establish their cases using common evidence.

As for the merits of their claim, the Third Circuit opined that, to prove an off-the-clock work claim, the plaintiffs would need to show they had worked off the clock, which constituted overtime, and that the employer had at least “constructive knowledge” of the same. The court did not explain what would constitute “constructive knowledge.”

To satisfy their wage-and-hour claims, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) pursuant to Citizens’ unwritten “policy-to-violate-the-policy,” the class MLOs performed overtime work for which they were not properly compensated; and (2) Citizens had actual or constructive knowledge of that policy and of the resulting uncompensated work.  See Kellar v. Summit Seating Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 177 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Reich v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 28 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th Cir. 1994)); see generally Davis v. Abington Memorial Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2014).  Thus, to satisfy the predominance inquiry, Plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) that Citizens’ conduct was common as to all of the class members, i.e., that Plaintiffs’ managers were carrying out a “common mode” of conduct vis-à-vis the company’s internal “policy-to-violate-the-policy,” and (2) that Citizens had actual or constructive knowledge of this conduct.  See Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 299; Dukes, 564 U.S. at 358; see also Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (explaining that, although a plaintiff’s suit may raise “important questions common to all class members,” class certification is proper only if proof of the essential elements of the class members’ claims does not involve “person-specific inquiries into individual work time [that] predominate over the common questions”).  

The Third Circuit’s holding that class and collective actions are sufficient different that it lacked jurisdiction over issues re the one even though it had jurisdiction over issues re the other firmly establishes a split among the Circuits on the issue. Interested readers may wish to check if either party seeks Supreme Court review.

Source: Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A.case no. 17-3464 (3rd Cir. 12/31/19).

DOL lifts its 80-20 rule for tipped employees

The Fair Labor Standards Act sets a minimum wage, but it allows employers to take a credit, i.e., pay below the minimum wage, for tipped employees.

To prevent abuse of the tip credit, the DOL under President Obama announced its 80-20 rule, which provided that the tip credit was not available, i.e., the tipped employee must be paid the full minimum wage, if 20% or more of their time is spent performing non-tippped work.

Now, instead of placing a time limit on non-tipped work, the DOL will permit a tip credit if non-tipped work is “performed contemporaneously with direct customer-service duties and all other requirements of the Act are met.”

Source: DOL opinion letter no. FLSA2018-27 (11/8/18).

FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions permit lawsuits against persons, including entities, even if not enterprises within interstate commerce

The Tenth Circuit held that, unlike its other provisions, FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision applies to persons whether or not they are engaged in interstate commerce. In the case, two workers became convinced that their employer owed them overtime under federal law (FLSA, the Fair Labor Standards Act). They complained to the DOL, were fired and the DOL sued the company alleging that the discharges were retaliation for cooperating with the DOL’s investigation.

FLSA’s overtime (and other provisions) apply only to employers who are engaged in interstate commerce. Here the company argued it had established it was not. The Tenth Circuit held that, whether it was or wasn’t was irrelevant in a retaliation claim. The court held that, as written, FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions do not require proof that the defendant is engaged in interstate commerce. The court held, therefore, the company could be sued for retaliation, whether or not it was engaged in interstate commerce.

Source: Acosta v. Foreclosure Connection, Inc., case no. 17-4111 (10th Cir. 2018).

Supreme Court ruled driver wasn’t required to arbitrate

The Supreme Court held that a driver for a trucking company need not arbitrate wage and related claims, even though the driver is technically an independent contractor, not an employee. In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court, first, decided that such driving falls within the Federal Arbitration Act’s exclusion for transportation workers, meaning, the Court held, the FAA does not apply. The FAA is of course the federal law that permits the arbitration of federal lawsuits. Next, the Supreme Court held that the FAA’s exclusion applies not only to employees but independent contractors.

Applicability of the decision is expected to be argued in a number of pending cases, including lawsuits brought by independent contractors who drive for social media based delivery services.

Source: New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, case no. 17-340 (1/15/19).

Court may enter default judgment if party refuses in “bad faith” to pay arbitration fees

As noted in a previous post, arbitration isn’t just a private form of litigation. It’s a fundamentally different process than litigation. One major difference is that, in arbitration, one or both parties (depending on their arbitration agreement) pays the arbitrator’s fees, and those fees need to be paid as the case is being processed. The parties can’t typically just wait and decide whether to pay after they receive the arbitrator’s award. Refusal to pay those fees — held the Eleventh Circuit — can result in a judgment against a party, if in bad faith, as opposed to inability to afford them.

The case followed a bit of a contorted process.

  • The litigation began when a recently discharged worker (Hernandez) filed a wage claim lawsuit in court against his former employer (Acosta Tractors).
  • The company moved to compel arbitration and provided the court with a copy of the arbitration agreement that Hernandez had signed. The court agreed and ordered the case to proceed to arbitration.
  • Then, additional claims were filed, separately, by Hernandez’s attorney on behalf of other individuals, which also went to arbitration.
  • Acosta Tractors asked the arbitrator to consolidate the various proceedings, but the arbitrator refused.
  • Within a year, the various arbitrations were still being processed, going through pre-hearing discovery.  The arbitrator’s fees alone were nearing $100,000.
  • Acosta Tractors filed a motion back in court asking the judge to take the case back from the arbitrator, saying it was costing too much time and money in arbitration. Acosta Tractors said the whole arbitration agreement had been intended to provide a quicker, less expensive process than litigation, but, it said, at that point “the Arbitration in this matter has failed its essential purpose.”
  • The court refused. Acosta Tractors asked the court to reconsider, and it again refused.
  • Stuck with a process it no longer wanted, and possibly could not afford, Acosta Tractors refused to pay the arbitrator’s fees.
  • At that point the arbitrator cancelled further proceedings, and Hernandez asked the court to enter default judgment against Acosta Tractors on his wage claim. The court did so. Never having had its day in court, this left Acosta Tractors, not only owing the arbitrator $100,000 in arbitrator fees, to process matters that hadn’t even gone to hearing yet, plus owing Hernandez on his underlying wage claim, a claim in which Acosta Tractors had been denying liability.

How much was Hernandez’s underlying claim for wages? According to the Eleventh Circuit decision, he demanded only $7,293, a relatively small amount no doubt in light of the overall time, money and energy spent defending his claim, even before any actual hearing was held on the merits of the case.

On appeal the Eleventh Circuit held that, when a party refuses to pay the arbitrator’s fees, a court can indeed enter default judgment against that party, but only if the court finds, first, that the party’s refusal to pay was in “bad faith,” as opposed to an inability to afford the fees.

On remand, the District Court may well find that Acosta acted in bad faith in choosing not to pay its arbitration fees. After all, Acosta acknowledges it quit paying after the arbitrator failed to consolidate Mr. Hernandez’s case with the other cases brought by other Acosta employees, and because it thought the arbitrator had allowed too much discovery. Acosta also noted that arbitration was set to cost more than Mr. Hernandez’s claim was worth. A calculated choice to abandon arbitration after getting adverse rulings from the arbitrator certainly looks like forum shopping. And this type of behavior would surely be a factor the District Court could consider in deciding whether to sanction Acosta by entering a default judgment. At the same time, a party’s good faith inability to afford the arbitration fees would be a factor properly considered to weigh against such a sanction. See Tillman v. Tillman, 825 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that plaintiff’s inability to pay arbitration fees was “not culpable and so does not merit a harsh penalty, particularly given the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits” (quotation omitted)).

The case is a powerful reminder that arbitration is an entirely different process than litigation, and in arbitration, the courts will rule that parties get what they get. Arbitration agreements are powerful and potentially useful tools. Their pros and cons should be carefully considered.

Source: Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors, Inc.case nos. 17-13057 and 17-13673 (11th Cir. 8/8/18).

Tenth Circuit holds that FLSA’ anti-retaliation provision reaches farther than its other clauses

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the nation’s leading wage-hour law. Most notably it includes requirements such as minimum wage, overtime and child labor laws. Those provisions apply onto to an “enterprise” that is engaged in interstate commerce. It also prohibits retaliation against workers who exercise FLSA rights. In a recent case, the Tenth Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provisions apply more broadly than the rest of FLSA.

As the Court explained the bulk of FLSA applies only to “‘an enterprise engaged in commerce.’ 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). ”Commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.’ § 203(b).”

However, the anti-retaliation provision of FLSA does not refer to an enterprise engaged in commerce. It states that “it shall be unlawful for any person . . . to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint . . . related to [FLSA].” § 215(a)(3) (emphasis added). A person is defined as “an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons.” § 203(a).

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision in FLSA reaches farther than its other protections to apply to any “person,” not just an “enterprise,” that engages in retaliatory conduct.

Source: Acosta v. Foreclosure Connection, Inc., — F.3d —, case no. 2:15-CV-00653-DAK (10th Cir. 8/15/18).

Supreme Court’s new expansive reading of FLSA is applied for first time by a Circuit Court

The Supreme Court held earlier this year in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) should no longer be construed narrowly in favor of employees but should, instead, be given a “fair” reading based on its own language. The Supreme Court’s ruling has just seen its first application in a Circuit Court case, entitled Mosquera v. MTI Retreading Co., decided by the Sixth Circuit.

In Mosquera, the employee held an engineering degree but argued he spent less than 50% of his time doing work that required an engineering degree and should, therefore, not have been classified as a professional employee exempt from overtime. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The Sixth Circuit noted the evidence that had been submitted in support of the employer’s summary judgment motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s own affidavit to the contrary, saying it was “unsubstantiated” and “self-serving.” The Sixth Circuit noted that, prior to Encino Motorcars, it would have looked on the plaintiff’s claim more favorably, interpreting the professional exemption “narrowly,” but under the Supreme Court’s new ruling, it was required to give the law a broader “fair” reading instead. Under the new approach to FLSA, the Sixth Circuit held the employer’s motion for summary judgment was “compelling” and as such, it held, the employee was properly characterized as a professional who was exempt from overtime.

Mosquera is no doubt the first in a long line of cases to come that will take a less “narrow” approach to interpreting FLSA.

Source:  Mosquera v. MTI Retreading Co. (6th Cir. 8/14/18).

Under the Supreme Court’s new “fair reading” doctrine, will FLSA exemptions be interpreted more broadly?

Historically courts have interpreted the overtime exemptions in FLSA (the Fair Labor Standards Act) narrowly in favor of employees. This “narrow construction” doctrine has made it difficult to treat employees who may be exempt as such unless they clearly fit an exemption. Now, the Supreme Court has rejected the “narrow construction” doctrine, ruling that it has not been “a useful guidepost for interpreting FLSA.”

The Supreme Court held that FLSA’s overtime obligations consist of two basic chunks of statutory language: The first requires employees to be paid overtime; the second chunk of language is a series of exemptions from that general rule. The Supreme Court held that FLSA provided courts with no basis for giving the first chunk of language any greater significance than the second chunk, in other words, to read the overtime requirement broadly at the expense of having to read the exemptions narrowly. Instead the Supreme Court held, both chunks of language should be given equal importance. The Supreme Court called this a “fair reading.”

Those exemptions are as much a part of theFLSA’s purpose as the overtime-pay requirement. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (“Legislation is, after all, the art of compromise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms often the price of passage”). We thus have no license to give the exemption anything but a fair reading.

Having rejected the narrow-construction doctrine, and instead applying its fair-reading doctrine, the Supreme Court then held that, in this case, service advisors at the car dealership in question qualified for an overtime exemption under FLSA’s special exemption for salesmen at car dealerships.

It is likely this ruling will have substantial impact in all FLSA overtime cases. It will not be limited to the FLSA’s exemption for salesmen at car dealerships. Rather the fair-reading doctrine will substantially expand the reach of all of FLSA’s overtime exemptions.

Source: Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, case no. 16-1362 (2018).

Colorado Supreme Court holds statute of limitations on wage claims runs from pay period following its due date

The Colorado Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations under the Colorado’s Wage Claim Act, CRS. 8-4-101 to -123, begins to run from the pay period when the wage first becomes due and is unpaid.

The facts of the case illustrate the importance of this holding. Like many states, Colorado’s wage claim laws permit an employee to sue at the time of termination for any unpaid wages. Most commonly wage claims involve amounts that are claimed due in that final paycheck, for example, vacation pay, but what about wages that were claimed due in prior periods? This case involved a group of workers who sought wages “as far back as 1992.” Colorado’s wage laws, like federal law (Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA), set a 2-year statute of limitations on wage claims, or 3 years if the violation is deemed wilful. The plaintiffs argued that the Act allowed them to seek all of their claimed wages, going back decades. In contrast, the company argued that they could seek only wages that came due in their final paycheck, nothing earlier.

The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with both parties, holding that the plaintiffs can seek any wages that came due in their final paychecks plus any that came due in the 2 years preceding their termination (or 3 if the claim is deemed wilful), but that they cannot seek wages going back farther than that.

We conclude that under section 109, terminated employees may seek wages or compensation that had been earned in prior pay periods but remain unpaid at  termination. This right, however, is subject to the statute of limitations in section 122, which runs from the date when the wages first became due and payable—the payday following the pay period in which they were earned. A terminated employee is thus limited to claims for the two (or three) years immediately preceding termination.

It is noted that the Court there said plaintiffs could seek claims for 2 (or 3) years “immediately preceding termination;” however, it would seem from the language of the Act and the Court’s own reasoning that the Court meant “immediately preceding (the filing of their lawsuit seeking wages upon) termination.” That issue is likely to be litigated in future cases.

Source: Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., case no. 17SZ77 (Colo. 3/5/18).

California is at it again, this time, how to calculate overtime

Under federal law (the Fair Labor Standards Act, “FLSA”), a non-exempt employee’s regular rate of pay is calculated, for overtime purposes, for each workweek, by totaling their compensation that week (excluding only certain limited things likely discretionary bonuses) then dividing by their total hours worked that week. They receive half that on top of the pay they’ve already received as compensation for overtime hours worked (in excess of 40).

Under a recent California case, California has decided, yet again, to be the odd jurisdiction out and, now, mandates that the denominator is only non-overtime hours.

What’s the difference? Here’s a simple hypothetical to illustrate. Assume in Week-1 of the year, John works 42 hours at a rate of $10 per hour. He gets paid $420 for that straight time (42x$10). That same week, John also receives an attendance bonus of $42. So far, his pay that week totals $462 ($420+$42). His regular rate is therefore, under FLSA, $11 ($462/42). He still hasn’t been overtime, so for overtime, he gets paid half that regular rate $5.50 ($11/2) for the 2 hours he worked overtime, in other words, an extra $11. His total pay that week, under FLSA, is $473.

Under the California approach, when it comes to calculating the regular rate, the company can only divide by 40. So his regular rate of pay is $11.55 ($462/40), nearly a 10% increase. That means his overtime rate is half that, making his total pay that week is $473.50 ($420+$42+$11.50).

Source: Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of Calif., case no. S232607 (Cal. 3/5/18).

DOL adopts Primary Beneficiary test for interns under FLSA

The U.S. Department of Labor has adopted the Primary Beneficiary test for deciding whether an intern must be paid as an employee or can be treated instead as an unpaid intern. This brings the DOL into alignment with a number of circuit courts, including the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh. The Primary Beneficiary test is generally seen as more favorable towards employers and students who wish to be treated as unpaid interns.

The Primary Beneficiary test asks, given the “economic reality” of the relationship, whether the putative intern or the company is the real “primary beneficiary” of the relationship. When asking that question, the DOL and courts that follow this test consider the following seven factors (quoting new DOL Fact Sheet #71):

  1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand that there is no expectation of compensation. Any promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the intern is an employee—and vice versa.
  2. The extent to which the internship provides training that would be similar to that which would be given in an educational environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training provided by educational institutions.
  3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of academic credit.
  4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the academic calendar.
  5. The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial learning.
  6. The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing significant educational benefits to the intern.
  7. The extent to which the intern and the employer understand that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job at the conclusion of the internship.

Wonder what a wage-hour class (collective) action complaint looks like?

A group of employees recently filed a lawsuit in federal district court in Denver, Colorado, against DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc., and Total Renal Care, Inc. Their complaint, which is publicly available in court records, lays out their claims and provides HR professionals with a chance to see what this kind of lawsuit can look like. Reminder as you review, the defendants have yet to respond to the complaint; therefore, the plaintiffs’ allegations are merely, just that, at this time, allegations, which are unproven. The plaintiffs’ allegations have yet to even be tested in litigation.

The complaint alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which is the nation’s leading, federal wage-hour law.

It was filed as a class action, more specifically, a collective action. Simply put, the difference between a class action and a wage-hour collective action is this: In a class action, representatives can sue on behalf of a group of similarly situated individuals, who can then opt out of the class if they choose not to be involved. FLSA provides for “collective” actions, in which individuals have to opt in to join the class. Either way court approval is required to proceed as a class/collective action, and this Complaint signals the plaintiffs’ intent to seek such approval.

Here the plaintiffs describe their alleged class as a group called the “Trailblazers,” which they describe, as follows:

2. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated are non-exempt hourly employees of Defendants. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated are all located within a geographic area designated and defined by Defendants as encompassing the states of Tennessee and Mississippi, and parts of Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, Alabama, and Georgia, and are collectively referred to by Defendants as the “Trailblazers.”

3. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated in the “Trailblazers” zone are subject to the same illegal policy and practice of failing to pay workers for all time worked and failing to pay overtime wages. That policy and practice is based, in part, on direct patient care hours per treatment and the calculation of direct patient care hours for each facility established by corporate DaVita that reduces Defendants’ patient to staff ratios and require Plaintiffs and those similarly situated to work more hours for which they are not properly compensated.

They allege, as follows, that wages were not paid for all hours worked and, as a result, overtime is also claimed:

6. Defendants required Plaintiffs and those similarly situated to clock out for
their meal breaks. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were/are required to perform work-related duties during meal breaks. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were/are not paid for work-related interruptions that occurred/occur during meal breaks during their shifts wherein they worked more than five consecutive hours. Defendants failed to change Plaintiffs’, and those similarly situateds’, time records to reflect the additional time worked on behalf of the employer even when Plaintiffs and those similarly situated requested that their time records be corrected by management.

7. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were/are not properly paid for other work-related duties which occurred outside of their scheduled shift hours and/or on weekends. Defendants failed to change Plaintiffs’, and those similarly situateds’, time records to reflect the additional time worked on behalf of the employer even when Plaintiffs and those similarly situated requested that their time records be corrected by management.

Allegedly compounding their claim for failure to pay, they also claim the employer “failed to properly maintain accurate daily records of all hours worked by Plaintiffs and those similarly situated as required by federal law because Defendants are not properly recording all hours worked, including overtime.”

What is sought in a class (collective) action like this under FLSA? These Plaintiffs claim “unpaid wages, overtime compensation, a declaratory judgment, liquidated damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs and attorneys’ fees and pre and post judgment interest associated with the bringing of this action, plus any additional relief that is just and proper for Plaintiffs and those similarly situated under federal law.”

Again, it is emphasized these are merely unproven allegations at this point. Still, the complaint itself, being public, provides HR professionals an opportunity to see what this kind of case can look like.

Congress Takes Shot at Browning-Farris – Law Week Colorado

Interested in reading Bill Berger‘s thoughts about Congress’ efforts to reverse Obama-era expansions of the Joint Employer doctrine, especially H.R. 3441 (which if passed would be the Save Local Business Act)? Check out the August 7, 2017 issue of Law Week Colorado. If passed, the Act would tighten the application of the Joint Employer doctrine (back) to requiring evidence of actual control by the purported joint employer in cases involving the National Labor Relations Act or the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Source: Congress Takes Shot at Browning-Farris – Law Week Colorado

Employer may share in tips if it does not claim a tip credit, at least in Tenth Circuit

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the country’s leading wage-hour law. Among other things, FLSA imposes a federal minimum wage. The federal minimum wage is a baseline; states and local governments are free to adopt higher minimum wages. Employers can, even under federal law, pay tipped employees a lower minimum wage if certain conditions are met. One condition is that the employer not share in the tips. To put it (overly) simply), tips can be pooled among other tipped employees, but not with the company or management.

What if the employer decides it wants the tips and doesn’t care about claiming the tip credit? In other words, can a company take some or all of the tips so long as it pays the full applicable minimum wage? The Tenth Circuit read the law and held, yes, in Marlow v. The New Food Guy, Inc., 861 F.3d 1157 (10th cir. 2017) (Employer that does not claim tip credit may take share of tips; FLSA’s prohibition against same is merely a condition for claiming a tip credit). The U.S. Department of Labor and Ninth Circuit say otherwise. See Oregon Restaurant & Lodging Assoc. v. Perez, 816 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2016) (Employer may not whether or not a tip credit is claimed).

While the Tenth Circuit’s opinion is clear, well reasoned and based on the language of FLSA, employers outside the Tenth Circuit should be aware of the distinction in the event they wish to share in tips.

Employer’s attorney may be held liable for retaliating against client’s former employee

In a decision that is already drawing harsh criticism, the Ninth Circuit held that an attorney may be liable to his client’s former employee for retaliation where the attorney contacted federal immigration authorities at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to advise, “if there is an interest in apprehending” the plaintiff, he would be attending a deposition on a certain date. ICE conducted its own investigation and determined “based on our records he has no legal status.” The plaintiff learned that ICE was aware of him, alleged that realizing the same had caused him severe, and as a result, he said, settled his wage-hour lawsuit against the former employer. After settling with the company, he sued its attorney, again, not his own attorney but opposing counsel. The Ninth Circuit noted that attorney had allegedly communicated with ICE about five other plaintiffs and held that the plaintiff’s claim should be allowed to proceed.

In doing so, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory language of FLSA’s retaliation provisions. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the nation’s primary wage-hour law. The Ninth Circuit read its anti-retaliation language as being broader than its substantive provisions regarding overtime, minimum wage, etc. The Ninth Circuit said the broad anti-retaliation language was more like Title VII’s (the nation’s leading anti-discrimination law). The Ninth Circuit held that, given the breadth of FLSA’s anti-retaliation language, such a claim is viable.

The decision has been called “flat-out bonkers” and possibly “the year’s worst employment law decision” and is being cited as an example of a decision by a court that “has officially lost its mind.”

Source: Arias v. Raimondo, Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2017 – Google Scholar