Posts

Colorado Supreme Court holds statute of limitations on wage claims runs from pay period following its due date

The Colorado Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations under the Colorado’s Wage Claim Act, CRS. 8-4-101 to -123, begins to run from the pay period when the wage first becomes due and is unpaid.

The facts of the case illustrate the importance of this holding. Like many states, Colorado’s wage claim laws permit an employee to sue at the time of termination for any unpaid wages. Most commonly wage claims involve amounts that are claimed due in that final paycheck, for example, vacation pay, but what about wages that were claimed due in prior periods? This case involved a group of workers who sought wages “as far back as 1992.” Colorado’s wage laws, like federal law (Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA), set a 2-year statute of limitations on wage claims, or 3 years if the violation is deemed wilful. The plaintiffs argued that the Act allowed them to seek all of their claimed wages, going back decades. In contrast, the company argued that they could seek only wages that came due in their final paycheck, nothing earlier.

The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with both parties, holding that the plaintiffs can seek any wages that came due in their final paychecks plus any that came due in the 2 years preceding their termination (or 3 if the claim is deemed wilful), but that they cannot seek wages going back farther than that.

We conclude that under section 109, terminated employees may seek wages or compensation that had been earned in prior pay periods but remain unpaid at  termination. This right, however, is subject to the statute of limitations in section 122, which runs from the date when the wages first became due and payable—the payday following the pay period in which they were earned. A terminated employee is thus limited to claims for the two (or three) years immediately preceding termination.

It is noted that the Court there said plaintiffs could seek claims for 2 (or 3) years “immediately preceding termination;” however, it would seem from the language of the Act and the Court’s own reasoning that the Court meant “immediately preceding (the filing of their lawsuit seeking wages upon) termination.” That issue is likely to be litigated in future cases.

Source: Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., case no. 17SZ77 (Colo. 3/5/18).

Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment, both, just sexual harassment, by a different name

Federal and state law prohibit sexual harassment. The courts have articulate two common types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo (where someone is asked to provide sex in exchange for a job benefit or punished on the job for not providing sex) and hostile work environment (where someone is subjected to “severe or pervasive” mistreatment because of their sex/gender). Whatever the kind of civil rights violation, a complaint of sexual harassment must first be lodged with the EEOC (or appropriate state agency) before a lawsuit can be filed.

In this case, the employee filed a the required administrative charge of sexual harassment but described only a hostile work environment, then when he later sued, he added quid pro quo allegations. The trial court held it was too late; he should have done so in his administrative charge. The Tenth Circuit disagreed holding that, under Title VII’s charge requirement and under federal pleadings standards, the employee’s allegations of sexual harassment were sufficient to put the employer on notice of any kind of sexual harassment, whether quid pro quo or hostile work environment. The court explained that quid pro quo and hostile work environment are just two different examples of sexual harassment.

The case was Jones v. Needham, case no. 16-6156 (10th Cir. 5/12/17).

Colorado Supreme Court adopts Iqbal-Twombly pleading standard

Under the federal and state rules of civil procedure, are not required to provide much specificity in their pleadings. Indeed the oft-cited rule is that they must simply give “notice” of their claims. This notice pleading rule was tightened in a pair of 2007 U.S. Supreme Court cases, called Iqbal and Twombly. The Iqbal-Twombly standard continues to impose a notice requirement but explains that, in order to give sufficient notice, a plaintiff must plead enough specific facts to raise their claims “above the speculative level,” such that, if the specifically pled facts are true, he would be entitled to relief under “a plausible claim.” This new notice pleading requirement is often called the “plausibility standard.” State supreme courts are free to decide their own rules of procedure. In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted Iqbal-Twombly’s plausibilty standard.

The case is Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50 (Colo. 6/27/16).